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IMPROVING JOB-WORKER MATCHING IN THE US LABOR MARKET:
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE EMPWYMENT SERVICE?
Business should provide clear and early rewards for those students who work the
hardest and learn the most.
AI Shankar, President of the American Federation of Teachers, 1989.
Schools should develop easily understood transcripts which at the request of students,
are readily available to employers. These transcripts should contain documentable
measures of achievement in a variety of fields as weD as attendance records.
Secretary of Labor's Commission on Workforce Quality, 1989, p. 12.
Create a national exmninaJion system to measure our students' and schools' progress in
meeting the national standards.
William Clinton and AI Gore, 1992, pg 85.
Employers will be urged to pay attention to [the new American Achievement Tests] in
their hiring. America 2000, 1991
Establish job-related (and industry specific) skill standards, built around core
proficiencies, and to develop skill certificates to accompany these standards.
America 2000, Track ill, 1991.
.<
"
.
~(\,
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Educational and political leaders are ca1Iing for improvements in the !;igna11ingand certification
of academic and occupational skills to the labor market. The Secretary's Commission on Achieving
Necessary Skills (SCANS), for example, has recommended a national system for assessing individual
accomplishments and work readiness that would be "designed so that, when teachers teach and students
study, both are engaged in authentic practice of valued competencies."1 For educational reformers,
better signaIling is not an end in itself but a means of inducing students, parents, teachers and school
boards to place greater priority on learning and of reforming the content and character of secondary
education~ Mark Tucker, one of the leaders of theof"eform movement, recently described the strategy,
when he wrote:
Examinations must be developed that measure progress toward those skills, new
curricula must be developed and taught, certificates of some sort must be invented for
those who have acquired the 'necessary skills,' and employers must honor those
certificates with rewards that are not given to those who have not acquired them. Only
then will millions of young people be motivated to take the tough courses and work
hard enough to meet the new standards.3
Will, however, employers play the part they have been assigned? When attractive jobs offering
training and access to career ladders are being filled, will employers take a serious look at recent high
school graduates and will they base their selections from this group, in part, on the results of these new
assessments? If large numbers of employers are to be induced to use the proposed new signalling
systems, the system must:
. provide information on skills and competencies that employers perceive to be relevant to their
jobs and that courts will conclude are job relevant and therefore meet the requirements of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
2~~
. be convenient and cheap for employers to use,
include the great majority of recent high school graduates,
It will not be easy to design a system of signalling and certifying academic and occupational
achievement which simultaneously attracts employer participation and maximizes student incentives to
learn, teacher incentives to set high standards and parental incentives to demand and pay for a quality
eduction. More will be said about these tradeoffs at the conclusion of the paper.
Improving education is not, however, the only reason why improved signaUing of worker skills to
employers is desirable. The same competitiveness and skill-mismatch concerns that figure so prominently
in the case for educational reform also imply a need for better matching of workers with specific skill
profiles to jobs with matching skill demands. Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990) have estimated, for example,
that if the "information about the job match that arises as a byproduct of experience" were obtained
instead by "a perfect screen at the begjnning of their working life," expected earnings would be roughly
8.5 to 13 percent lUgher during the first period of their working lives..
It is this issue-the potential benefits of better match making between jobs and workers--that is
the subject of this paper. The first section of the paper reviews data on the effectiveness of current job-
worker matchmaking. Managers of small and medium size firms are very often unpleasantly surprised by
the performance of new hires. Employers report that new hires with six months of tenure actually
produce 12 percent less on average than they were expected to produce when they were hired. Nearly 90
percent of the within job/firm variance in realized productivity of workers with 6 months of tenure was
not anticipated at the time hiring decisions were made. Another indicator is turnover. Turnover is
higher in the United States than in Japan and Europe and barriers to the flow of information about
young people's accomplishments in secondary school appear to be contributing to the turnover.
The second section of the paper examines the characteristics of the match making process that
are associated with (a) smaller or less frequent negative surprises in realized productivity, (b) more
profitable watches, (c) more productive matches and (d) lower probabilities of turnover. While within
job differences in actual and expected productivity at six months of tenure were predictable by
background characteristics of workers known at the time of hiri.i1g,the surprise in these realizations was
not. The surprise is also not predicted by the recruitment source of the new hire but was predicted by
the type of reference checks undertaken during hiring. Measures of worker productivity and match
profitability were influenced/predictable by some features of the hiring process. Comparing two workers
hired for the same job at the same firm, those hired on the basis of a reference had been obtained from
a previous supervisor and/or from someone whose recommendation had been used in the past were
significantly more productive. Those hired on the basis of a recommendation by a personnel office were
significantly less productive and profitable. In addition, individuals who were referred by a public agency
were significantly less profitable, those recruited through advertisements were less productive, and those
recommended by a vocational teacher were significantly more profitable (not at first but at the time of
the interview).
Section 3 reviews other evidence on the effectiveness of the Employment Service. The
Employment Service share of new hires placed has fallen from 20 percent to 7 percent. At present only
.
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18 percent of its registrants find a job through an ES referral and the quality of these jobs is not high. A
DOL funded evaluation of the ES in 1980-81 found that women who received a referral had shorter
spells of unemployment and a higher probability of being employed than women who applied at the ES
but were not given a referral. Receiving a referral had no relationship with the employment probability
of men and no relationship (point estimates were negative) on the quality of the jobs obtained by both
men and women.
~
Trying to get rid of the stigma attached to being an ES referral, the ES is experimenting with a
new referral system in which referrals are based on the General Aptitude Test Battery, a battery of
employment aptitude tests measuring general academic ability, perceptual speed and psychomotor ability.
Adverse impact on minority groups was avoided by referring on the basis of within-group percentile
scores (now outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Where it has been implemented it has turned out
to be very popular with employers. The review of the empirical evidence which supports this new system
provided in Section 4 concludes that the GATB has sufficient validity to substantially improve the quality
of matches arranged through the ES. Different jobs require different constellations of generic
competencies. Craft and operative jobs require spatial and mathematical skill, not verbal ability. Clerical
jobs require verbal and mathematical skill but not spatial. Relevant occupational work experienCe'is also
an extremely important determinant of performance. Consequently, referral algorithms should be based
occupationally relevant experience and differentiated indices of various cognitive competencies.
Section 5 calculates an estimate of the magnitude of the social benefits that would be generated
by a major expansion in the use of VG-GA TB for employee selection. The social benefits are found to
be quite large but if affIrmative action is scrapped simultaneously, minority representation in high status
jobs drops precipitously. Affirmative action is therefore particularly important if employment tests
become a more important means of selection for jobs.
Section 6 examines long term policy goals and concludes the goal of creating incentives for hard
study requires that accomplishments in school should be one of the factors used to refer young job
seekers to potential job openings. The practical policy suggestions that seem to be implied by the
empirical analysis are identified by being printed in italics.
I. HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE MATCHING OF YOUNG WORKERS TO JOBS ?
A 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) provides us with unique data on the effectiveness of job-worker matching. A four page
questionnaire was mailed to approximately 11,000 firms, and after 3 follow up waves, 2599 response were
obtained.s The questionnaire focused on the owner Imanager's experiences in hiring and training
workers in a particular job. This job was selected by asking the owner the following question: "For which
job have you hired the most people over the last two or three years. (If you have more than one job for
which you have done a lot of hiring, please select the job requiring the greatest skill.) All future
questions refer to this job: After a series of general questions about the character of the job and the
worker qualities that were sought when filling that job, the manager was asked to select two individuals
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who had been hired for this job and answer all future questions specifically with reference to those two
workers. The selection was made in response to the following question:
Please think of the last person hired for this job Gob X) by your firm prior to August
1986 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your firm. Call this
individual person A. The individual hired for job X immediately before person A is
called person B. Do not include rehires of former employees.
The owner was then asked two and a half pages of questions about these two employees. Information of
varying degrees of completeness was obtained on 1624 person A's and 1403 person B's. Managers were
asked to report starting and current wage rates and to rate the worker's productivity "on a ratio scale
from zero to 100" at three different points in time-"on the sixth day after starting work," "at the end of
the first 6 months" and "currently or 2 weeks before leaving the firm." The owner was also asked "when
you hired the individual, what did you think it [productivity] would be after 6 months."
The difference between this retrospective report of what was expected from the new hire at the
end of 6 months and the same respondent's report of 'actual' productivity provides a direct measure of
the accuracy of the predictions upon which hiring decisions are based. Actual productivity at six months
(mean=64.6 on the 0-100 scale) turned out to be 12 percent less on average than expected productivity
(mean =73). While only 165 percent of the new hires did five or more points better than expected, 50.4
percent did five or more points worse than expected and 25.8 percent did 20 or more points worse.
Differences between the actual productivity of two workers doing the same job at the same firm
with the same (six months) tenure were quite large and very poorly predicted at the time of hiring. The
standard deviation of the differential between realized productivity of Person B and Person A, SD{fI'" III-
fI'" AI}, was 33 percent of the mean level of productivity at six months of tenure. The standard deviation
of the discrepancy between Person B's surprise and person A's surprise, SD{ (PI'"lII-pEXIII]- (PI'"AI-pEXAI]},
was nearly as large, 31 percent of the mean productivity. Thus, the ratio of the variance of the surprise
differential to the variance of the actual productivity differential was.88. The variance of the surprise
differential was three times the variance of differentials in expected productivity.
Another indicator of the quality of job-worker matches is how long they last. One useful
yardstick for judging turnover is the experience of other nations, so comparative data on job tenure
distributions is presented in Table 1. In the early 1980s, 40 percent of American workers had been on
their current job for less than 2 years. With the exception of Australia, no other nation had such a high
proportion of short tenure employees. The comparable proportions were 21.2 percent for Japan, 18.6
percent for Germany in 1985, 17.8 percent for France, 33.1 percent for Canada, and 24-25 percent for
Belgium, Holland and the United Kingdom. For workers with less than one year of tenure, the
probability of a separation in the next 12 months was 59 percent in the United States and 24 percent in
Japan.s Adjusting tenure distributions for the age profile of the workforce diminishes the tenure gap
somewhat but does not eliminate it.
Job shopping and try out hiring are more common in the US than Japan and Europe. Our data
on surprises in job performance suggest that poor initial match-making may be one of the causes of this
phenomenon. There are major institutional barriers in the U.S. to the free flow of information about job
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applicants--such as EEO testing guidelines, the failure of some high schools to send out transcripts, large
variations in grading standards across schools and across courses within a school, and the threat of law
suits if bad recommendations are given--that do not exist in other countries. German and Japanese
employers are much more careful in their selection of blue collar and clerical employees than American
employers.7 Investments in public labor exchange agencies are substantially greater in Europe than in
the US. The ratio of employment service staff to population is 1/5600 in England, 1/1607 in Sweden,
1/1250 in Germany and 1/11047 in the United States.s
If poor initial match making is a cause of the high American turnover rates, significant social
costs are being incurred. While turnover helps the workers find a better match, it lowers the efficiency
and reduces the benefits of on-the-job training. It discourages investments in firm specific skills, and for
any given a rate of investment in specific skills, turnover necessarily reduces the stock of workers who
have and use the skills.s Many of those trained move on to other firms where the firm specific
components of training yield no benefits. Moreover, turnover disrupts learning regardless of whether
the skills being learned are generic or firm specific. Schools teach general skills and follow a common
curriculum, yet have great difficulty when students change schools frequently. Since the teaching of
generic occupational skills in firms is less standardized than the teaching of school subjects, turnover.is
likely be a more serious barrier to learning at work than at school.
II. THE CORRELATES OF SUCCESSFUL JOB-WORKER MATCHES
Proposals to improve the $igTIaJlingof information about worker skills and reform labor market
intermediaries need to be based on an understanding of how current institutions work. The remainder of
the paper attempts to add to our understanding of how well current job-worker match making
institutions work. This section examines whether the success of job-worker matches is predictable and if
so, what predicts success. Since the data come from employers, success is defined primarily from their
point of view. Four different indicators of the success of a match are examined; the surprise in
productivity realizations, the profitability of new hires, the productivity of new hires and turnover. The
empirical models that will be used to analyze these issues are presented first. The predictability of the
surprise in productivity realizations is examined second and the hiring process correlates of successful job
worker matches analyzed last.
2.1 Empirical Models
Let us assume that in a sample of people who have been recently hired for the j th job, that the
outcomes of a match between a job and a worker, Y" depend upon a vector of personal characteristics
describing the individual's background and education (A), a vector of characteristics of the job/worker
match (eg. the selection procedures employed when the individual was hired or previous training that is
relevant to this specific job
~ ,) and characteristics of the job Clt). Real world relationships are not,
however, additive in the levels of these characteristics. Shop floor practices and technology often
constrain the degree to which individual differences in learning ability or competence can generate
individual differences in productivity or turnover outcomes. If the workers of fIrm A are more adaptable
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and competent than firm B's workers, fum A may be able to introduce profitable changes in technology
and work assignments that firm B is unable to introduce. Comparable differences in adaptability and
competence between occupants of a particular job might generate much smaller effects on individual
productivity.
Alternatively, the opposite might prevail. Work might be structured such that equipment
breakdowns can be diagnosed and repaired by just a few highly skilled operatives. Once a few highly
skilled operatives are recruited or trained, there may be little need to train others. Either way, the effect
of individual characteristics and recruitment source on the productivity, turnover and profitability of a
new hire may differ depending on whether one is analyzing differences within firms or differences across
firms. Processes by which individuaJs are selected and retained in particular jobs may also cause
coefficients describing relationships within firms between a worker trait and an outcome such as wages or
productivity @) to be different from coefficients describing the impact of differences between fum means
of the worker trait (d). A simple specification which takes this into account is:
(1) y~ = ~~--&) + ~~'~J) + A& + 4SJ + ,.z. + u, +
~
where
y~
::~
~.:-
is the 'k'th outcome of the match between employee 8i8and job 8j: The
outcomes being modeled include turnover, wage rate, and supervisor reports of the
worker's productivity and profitability.
~
is a vector of background characteristics of individual 8i"which describe generic
competencies (means of these characteristics for a job are -&),
~, is a vector of characteristics of the match between worker and job (eg. recruitment
source, reference checks made, and training that effect performance in job 8j8(means of
these characteristics for a job are
~J)'
is a vector of measurable characteristics of the job (j) including characteristics of the
employer,
~
u, is a random error that is specific to the match between individual and the job.
~
is an error that is specwc to the job or employer respondent.
Equation (1), however, can seldom be estimated because data on the job specific mean values of
X and ~ are generally not available. An additional problem is that for some outcomes, such as
supervisory ratings of skills and job performance, operational measures are inherently relative to others
at the firm and not on a scale that is likely to be comparable from firm to firm. For outcomes with
metrics that are comparable across jobs (eg. wage rates, turnover, absenteeism, percentage changes in
productivity), models of the following form are commonly estimated is:
(2) y~ = ~ + 1!,.S, +;~ + u~
Results of estimating equation 2 will be presented for outcomes such as turnover and the surprise in
productivity realizations, but the possibly biased nature of these estimates must be recognized. When
~'s and~"s are used to predict Y in population samples, & andd,. are being constrained to equal~k
and u.,..and the estimated coefficients end up being a mix of the two. A second problem is caused by the
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correlation between unmeasured characteristics of the individual and characteristics of the occupation
and job which influence wage rates, productivity and turnover. As a result, the covariance between
'I and
~, is often nonzero, so biased estimates of 0..,.and 4 often result.
If our interest is in the P's, not the A's, both of these problems can be finessed by estimating a
model predicting the differences in the outcomes experienced by two people in the same job at the same
firm as a function of differences in their background characteristics, as is shown in Equation 3.
(3) Y1jk-Y. =~(x'-k) + ~(S1J-§2I) + (U1(U2l)
where person 1 and 2 both work in the same job "j".
Estimating this model produces unbiased estimates of IL. and
~
if the ~'s and the ~ ,S are not
correlated with the De's.
When we estimate equation 3, the purpose is Dot to estimate a structural relationship between
worker traits and job performance for the entire population of workers and jobs. The unknown
character of the selection process by which job applicants were selected for and retained in jobs makes
estimation of pre-selection structural relationships infeasible in NFIB and EOPP data.1o We are
e:nmining instead the relationships between personal characteristics, hUing process variables and
indicators of the success of the match which survive selection. In fact, the nature of the selection is
critical to the hypotheses that are to be tested.
., 2.2 Are the Predictions of Job Performance made by Employers Rational?
We saw in section 1 that employer predictions of the productivity of new hires are quite
imperfect. Is this because they lack the information necessary to make better predictions or because they
misuse the information they have? We can distinguish between these two explanations by determining
whether our direct measure of the surprise in productivity realizations is predictable by information that
was available to the employer when the hiring decision was made. If it is not, we will conclude the
problem is incomplete information, not irrational use of the information available.
Many employers are remarkably casual about their hiring selections. In the NFIB data 60
percent of recent hires had been selected without a contact being made with a supervisor on a previous
job and only 24 percent had been asked to demonstrate their skills prior to being hired. Even though
over half of the new hires had received relevant formal training (either on or off-site) from a previous
employer, only 7 percent of new hires had shown their prospective employer a certifIcate of training
received on previous jobs. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that employers sometimes learn
about a new hire's previous training after she has been working at the fIrm for awhile. Under these
circumstances, the new information on previous training is likely to be correlated with the surprise in
productivity realizations. Two hypotheses are suggested by these comments:
Ho: The discrepancy between expected and realized productivity should:
(a) not be predictable by information on worker characteristics that was available to all
participants in the market at the time the hiring decision was made.
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(b) be predictable by new information on worker quality not available to market participants at
the time hiring decisions were being made.
'J};.
Surprise: Evidence on the predictability of the surprise in productivity realizations can be found
in Table 2 and Table 3. The flfst 2 columns of Table 1 report estimates of Equation 2. The within-firm
difference models (Equation 3) can be found in column 3 of Table 2 and, for an expanded model
including hiring process variables, in column 1 of Table 3. Our hypothesis that expectations were
generally rational is supported by the instability and insignificance of the coefficients on worker
characteristics known at the time of hiring, the insignificance of the F Test on the background variables
for all three regressions in Table 2 and the marginal significance [an F of 152 is significantly greater
from zero at the .091 level] of the worker background characteristics in the expanded model presented in
column 1 of Table 3. The inability of the background variables to predict the surprise in productivity
realizations contrasts with their ability to predict expected productivity (see column 4 of Table 2). The
hiring process variables also featured in Table 3 will be discussed in section 2.3.
There are exceptions and the exceptions provide support for hypothesis Ho(b). Employers were
pleasantly surprised by the productivity of workers with relevant work experience and unpleasantly
surprised by the productivity of those with irrelevant work experience (older workers who laclred relevant
work experience). Since total work experience was easy to measure prior to hiring, the combined effect
of the two variables should have been well foreseen by employers, but since the two variables are
strongly correlated, a positive coefficient for relevant experience in the model predicting the productivity
surprise tends to cause the coefficient on total work experience to become negative.
TenurelTurnover: Tenure is another indicator of the quasi rents being generated by a match--
one that presumably reflects both the worker and employer satisfaction with the match (not just
employer quasi rents as with other variables). While there is some weak support for Weiss's hypothesis
that the high school diploma is a sign of a .sticks to it' character trait, the background variables as a
group consistently fail a significance test in this data set.
2.3 The Determinants of Match Profitability and Productivity
If assessments of differences in the expected productivity of job applicants grouped by traits such
as schooling and training are generally accurate, competition for workers should result in wage offers
reflecting expected differences in productivity. Many employers respond to these competitive pressures
by paying higher wages to the more qualified new hires, so a similar condition may apply across new
hires at a firm even when they all have the same job title. Consequently, predictable productivity
differences between new hires at a firm are to be expected. If, however, employer expectations about the
productivity of new hires are rational and labor markets are competitive and efficient, the ex post
profitability of a new hire may not be predictable by information that was generally available to hiring
decision makers.
On the other hand, the quasi rents generated by a job-worker match--the gap between a
worker's productivity in a job and her reservation wage-ovary considerably across workers in the same job
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and their magnitude is often predictable. Match specific quasi rents occur when a worker has skills
which are useful at only a few local firms or when the employer has access to 'inside' information about
the quality of the worker (ie. information not available to other employers). Above normal quasi rents
may also be the result of a low reservation wage (possibly because of the location of the work site or
friendliness of supervisors and coworkers). When match specific rents are large, a whole range of wage
rates may be consistent with preservation of the job-worker match. From the firm's point of view a wide
gap between a worker's productivity and her reservation wage is a good thing, because it means turnover
will be low and the expected profitability of the match will be high (either because lower wage offers or
higher productivity). Thus. characteristics of the job-worker match (eg. the availability of high quality
information on a worker's likely performance in the job or training that is uniquely relevant to the job)
which produce a better match should, therefore, coorelate positively with the profitability of the match
and the productivity of the worker in that match.
The question to be posed to the data, therefore is WDosome methods of evaluating and selecting
new hires result in more productive and profitable job worker matches than other methods?W Sixty
percent of the hiring decisions were made without the benefit of obtaining a reference from the new
hire's supervisor on a previous job. For the other 40 percent, did the extra time devoted to getting such
references payoff by helping the employer select more productive and profitable employees? The threat
of lawsuits have made many employers reluctant to give honest references. Personnel offices are
particularly sensitive to the legal dangers of giving references, so the information content of their
references has probably deteriorated the most. Some personnel offices have been said to be in the
lemon marketing business. This suggests the hypothesis that when a personnel office was the only
reference checked (this was the case for 45 percent of hiring events), the productivity and profitability of
the match is likely to be low. Is this the case?
The trustworthiness of the individual providing a reference is obviously important. Hiring a
second or third time on the recommendation of a particular person indicates satisfaction with the
accuracy of the information provided. Twenty five percent of the hiring events were based on such
recommendations. Are the new hires selected on the recommendation of someone whose referrals have
been used before indeed more productive and more profitable and to have longer tenure?
Are employers able to make more accurate predictions about future job performance for
applicants recruited through informal channels than through formal channels such as newspaper ads and
the public employment service? If so, we would expect new hires recruited through channels that provide
better inside information to be more productive and profitable and to have lower turnover.
Model specification: These issues are addressed by estimating within firm difference models
predicting various measures of the success of the match with dummy variables for types of reference
checks made, recruitment source and a comprehensive set of background characteristics. The analysis is
replicated in two different data sets: the NFIB survey and the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects
(EOPP) Employer Survey, a similarly structured survey conducted in the late spring of 1982 (see
Appendix A for a description). Both data sets had measures of the following background variables:
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schooling, relevant vocational education, relevant private vocational education, relevant work experience,
age, gender, tenure, potential tenure, time since hire and whether the job was originally defined as
temporary. The analysis of the NFIB data also employs data, not available in EOPP, on marital status,
race, Hispanic ethnicity, receipt of classroom training from JTP A, and receipt of formal employer
sponsored training either on site or off-site.
The indicators of a successful match analyzed in the NFIB data are the surprise in productivity
realizations at six months of tenure, relative profitability (initial, at six months and at the time of the
interview), productivity at the time of the interview, an bdex of innovative suggestions made by the
worker, an index of the worker's willingness to stay late when work is not completed and the logarithm
of tenure. The profitability differential between two employees was calculated by subtracting the wage
differential and the training cost differential from the productivity differential (after placing them all in a
common metric where 1 is the average productivity of workers with six months of tenure). Details on
how this variable was operationalized and a defense of the ratio scale assumption that lies behind it are
given in Appendix C. Note that since recruitment and turnover costs are not included in this definition
of profitability, a complete picture of profitability requires an examination of the turnover models as well.
The innovative suggestions index comes from the following question: "Has
-
suggested any
ways of improving sales or productivity?" There were four possible responses: "(1) No ; (2) Yes but not
adopted; (3) Adopted 1-2 ideas; (4) Adopted 3+ ideas." Ranging from 1 to 4, the index has a mean of
2.01 and an across-firm standard deviation of 1.U.
The "stays late" index is based on responses to the following question: "If work is not completed,
does this employee stay late to finish it?" There were four possible responses: "(1) No" [coded 1] ;"(2)
Yes if paid" [coded 2] ;"(3) Yes w/o pay" [coded 4] and (4) yes. 'exempt' employee [coded 3]. Ranging
from 1 to 4, the index has a mean of 2.29 and an across-firm standard deviation of 1.02.
In the analysis of EOPP data, the outcome variables predicted were productivity (during the first
two weeks, the next 11 weeks, and at the time of interview or separation), training costs, starting and
current wage rates, tenure, dummy variables for a quit and for involuntary turnover and profitability at
two points in time (during the first three months and later at the time of the interview or separation).
Despite differences in sampling, selection processes and in variable definitions, the two data sets
generate remarkably similar findings. The data analysis strategy being employed in this paper has not
been tried before so it is heartening that results turn out to be remarkably robust. For example, in both
data sets productivity at the time of the interview was significantly influenced by years of schooling and
years of previous relevant work experience but not by total work experience (age) or relevant classroom
occupational training from a public school or college.
Information on recruitment source of the new hire was available in both data sets. Only the
NFIB data contained information of reference checks. The questions from which these variables were
derived are given in Appendix B. The results of the analysis of NFIB and EOPP data are reported in
Tables 3 and 4.
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Reference Checks: The results give substantial support for our hypotheses about the effects of
reference checks. Twenty-one of twenty-four coefficients had the predicted sign and the three reference
check variables as a group had significant effects on 5 of the 8 variables: the surprise in productivity
realizations, profitability at six months, current productivity, innovative suggestions and the "stays late"
index. The extra time it requires to get a reference from an applicant's supervisor on previous jobs
clearly pays off. New hires for whom such reference checks were made were 4.6 percent more
productive than expected at six months, 6.4 percent more productive at the time of the interview,
significantly more likely to make suggestions that improve sales or productivity, and significantly more
willing to stay late to finish work.
References given by personnel offices appear to be misleading. They are worse than no
reference at all. New hires who were vouched for by the personnel office at a previous job but for whom
no reference was obtained from a previous supervisor were 10 percent less productive than expected, 12.6
percent less productive at the time of the interview and less profitable at six months tenure by 19 percent
of average productivity.
There is also some support for our hypothesis that repeat references are more accurate. People
hired on references given by individuals whose evaluations are a known quantity are more profitable, (by
8 percent of average productivity) both at 6 months of tenure and at the time of the interview.
Recruitment Source: With a few exceptions recruitment source did not have significant effects
on indicators of the success of a match. Informal recruitment channels that might possibly be providing
screening services--frien<b, relatives, current employees, other employers [in EOPP] and "other" [in NFIB
data]--were the excluded category, so negative coefficients were expected on most of recruitment source
dummies. Negative signs did predominate but magnitudes were generally small and consequently almost
all coefficients were insignificant. The exceptions to this generalization, however, are interesting and
important.
Unions: In the EOPP data it was possible to examine the effect of referrals by unions. Not
surprisingly, such referrals had large positive effects on initial productivity and starting wage rates and a
negative effect on initial profitability.
Advertisements: In NFIB data workers recruited through advertisements were significantly less
profitable initially and less likely to suggest ways to improve sales or productivity in NFIB data. In
EOPP data they were significantly less productive both initially and at the time of the interview and more
likely to leave involuntarily.
Teachers and Schools: In EOPP data school referrals were not significantly different from the
residual category on any outcome measure. In NFIB data dividing school referrals into two types--
referrals by vocational teachers and major professors and an 'other teacher, principal and placement
office' category--produced some interesting results. New hires recommended by a vocational teacher or
major professor were significantly more profitable (by 16 percent of average productivity) at the time of
the interview or separation. Referrals made by other teachers were not significantly different from the
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excluded category. Non-significant negative coefficients predominated with one exception--an almost
significant positive coefficient when innovative suggestions was being predicted.
Public Labor Market Intermediaries: Our most important rmding, however, is the bad news
regarding public labor market intermediaries. Holding the job, the firm and a host of background
variables (including training by JTPA) constant, referrals from public agencies (the Employment Service,
vocational rehabilitation agencies, JTPA and community based organizations) were, in NFIB data,
significantly less willing to stay late, and less profitable (by about 15 percent of average productivity) both
initially and after 6 months. In EOPP data they were significantly less productive (8 to 12 percent less)
in all three time periods, significantly less profitable (by 12 to 14 percent) and significantly (26
percentage points) more likely to be dismissed and less likely to have long tenure. When public agencies
were separated into the Employment Service (ES) and all others and separate dummy variables created
for each (simultaneous referral from both was treated as an ES referral), point estimates for the two
variables were almost identical.
One would expect the least productive workers to be dismissed or choose to quit. If SOselective
attrition will attenuate correlations between recruitment source and the productivity of experienced
workers. This presumption is tested in the bottom row of Table 4 where effects of recruitment source on
productivity net of the wage are calculated for paired comparisons in which both members of the pair
were still at the firm at the time of the interview. Limiting the comparisons to stayers causes all effects
of recruitment source on productivity net of wage costs to lose statistical significance. Public agency
referrals who were 12 percent less productive when some of the comparisons were between retained and
separated employees are 6 percent more productive when comparisons are limited to stayers only. By
the time of the interview the firm has dismissed most of the public agency referrals who were of below
average productivity. It would appear that public labor market intermediaries were not serving their
employer constituency very well. Do private employment agencies do a better job?
Private Emplovment A2encies: Employers must pay substantial fees when they hire a private
agency referral. What is the advantage of such referrals that compensates them for this fee? Their
referrals were not significantly better than new hires recruited through other channels. In fact, in EOPP
data, referrals from private employment agencies were a significant 13 percent less productive during the
third through thirteenth week and 32 percent less profitable during the first three months. Apparently,
the problems of the Employment Service cannot be solved by contrading out the function to private
employment agencies.
If the quality of the matches that result was poor, why did employers request any referrals from
the public agencies? Why do they pay for the services of private agencies? Might it be because they
save on the direct costs of screening and interviewing job applicants? We turn, therefore, to an
examination of how the direct costs of recruiting, screening and selecting a new hire vary across
recruitment channels.
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2.4 The Direct Cost of Hiring through Alternative Recruitment Channels
There are two types of costs of making a hiring decision. If the position remains unfilled while
the search is underway, output and profits may have to be forgone until the opening is filled. For the
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs which predominated in the EOPP data set, however, most firms either
received sufficient advance notice of forthcoming vacancies and/or filled the openings quickly, so delay
costs do not appear to have been very large."
The second type of cost--the direct costs--are the opportunity cost of the time that the finn's
owner and employees devote to recruiting, screening and interviewing job candidates. Public and private
employment agencies offer to take over much of the recruitment and screening function, so one might
imagine that firms using these recruitment sources might have lower direct hiring costs. This, however,
does not appear to be the case (see Table 5). Data from the EOPP survey imply that when the new hire
selected was a referral from the Employment Service, the decision process took 14.8 hours of staff time,
significantly more than for informal recruitment sources. When the referral came from some other
government agency, the decision process took 179 hours. When a private employment agency was used,
decision making time was 15.6 hours. Decision making takes less time when informal channels are used;
6.1 hours, for instance, when relatives of the owner or a current employee were hired. Decisions to hire
a 'walk in' required only 9 hours.
It would appear that employers either (a) are unaware of how poorly they fare with ES and
private employment agency referrals, (b) are forced into using them by an absence of other applicants for
a hard to fill job, or (c) hire referrals from public agencies for altruistic reasons (eg. they have been
asked to give a disadvantaged or handicapped person a chance).
III. THE DILEMMAS OF THE EMPWYMENT SERVICE
3.1 The Dilemma
The Employment Service has multiple constituencies: different types of job applicants, employers
and the voting public. How is it to balance the interests of its various constituencies? The Employment
Service has always been in the situation of having fewer employer requests for referrals than clients
seeking jobs. During the 1950s and early 196Os,it took the position that it could best serve job seekers
as a whole by taking employer preferences as given and attempting to fill job orders with the 'best'
possible applicants.
The standard practice up to [the mid 19605] had been for a personnel representative in
a firm to call a local office staff member with whom they had worked in the past, place
a job order, and be confident that the local office staff person would only refer
individuals in accordance with the employer's hiring requirements.'2
During this period ES referrals accounted for nearly 20 percent of the nation's new hires. Priorities
shifted in the mid 1960s and the ES "became one of the nation's public advocacy weapons for affirmative
action on behalf of targeted populations"'3:
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In the mid-l960s local office procedures were modified in several ways. First,
discriminatory referral procedures, which had always been frowned upon, were now
more actively discouraged. And second, individual staff member control of job orders
began to decline, which meant that the one-on-one relationships between employer
representatives and State Employment Security Agency staff members were weakened.
Both of these challenged the ability of the local office to offer a continuing guarantee of
screening reliability. Many observers attribute the growth of private employment
agencies coincident with the stagnation of the public employment service system to this
social responsibility of the public agencies.'"
Funding formulas were skewed to emphasize placement of targeted groups rather than total placements.
In 1978, for example, nearly 40 percent of the Employment Service's budget came from contracts with
CETA, WIN, Food Stamps and other federal programs.'5 Many of these contracts were performance
based (ie. X dollars per target group member placed). The Employment Service's market share fell to
about 8 percent of new hires in 1971. It remained low throughout the 70s and 80s and in 1987 Was about
7 percent. The result is that in 1987/88 it placed only 17.5 percent of the 18,439,000 people who
requested help in seeking work.'8 In addition, the quality of the positions for which it obtained job
orders deteriorated.
For a labor market intermediary to succeed:
Employers must have confidence in the ability and willingness of the labor exchange
broker to conduct the appropriate screening function, and the job seeker must also have
confidence that they will be made aware of appropriate opportunities through the
broker's auspices.17
,','
d.~ By 1983 the reputation of the ES had deteriorated to such an extent that most employers did not want to
receive referrals of workers eligible for TJTC tax credits worth nearly 50 percent of the wage if the
referral was to be made by the Employment Service.'8 The Employment Service lost much of its
middle class constituency and was, consequently, unable to fend off substantial budget cuts during the
most severe recession since Wodd Warn. The very high priority placed on serving one particular
constituency resulted over time in the agency losing the supvort of other constituencies: employers,
voters, and nondisadvantaged workers. Since they control the scarcest element of the job matching
process, job openings, employer disillusionment was particularly damaging. The agency even began to
lose its ability to serve the disadvantaged.
3.2 How well does the Employment Senice Serve Job Seekers?
How effectively does the ES serve job seekers? The share of job seekers using the ES has fallen
from 30.2 percent in 1970 to 21.1 percent in 1988.'9 Its share of job placements is substantially smaller.
Only 5.5 percent of those employed in January 1973 reported they had found their current job through
the ES.20 The ES share of new hire activity was 3.6 percent in EOPP data and 2.8 percent in NFIB
data. In 1984/85 the median wage of job seekers placed through the ES was only slightly above the
minimum wage and about half the average wage of nonsupervisory workers.2'
The low quality of the jobs for which the ES provides referrals is sometimes attributed to its
mandate to give priority to finding jobs for the economically disadvantaged and the handicapped. In
1987-88,19.7 percent of ES applicants were economically disadvantaged. The ES accounts for a
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considerably larger share of the jobs found by members of minority groups and these groups were 32
percent of ES registrants.22
Did job seekers who were referred to job openings by the Employment Service get better jobs
than they would otherwise have gotten? Johnson, Dickinson and West (JDW) studied this question for
the Department of Labor in the early 198Os. Baseline interviews were collected from a sample of 8000
new applicants during 1980-81 in 30 ES offices spread across 27 states with follow up interviews coming 6
to 9 months later. JDW estimated OLS models predicting wage rates, earnings and employment in the
6 month period following application to the ES while controlling for earnings during the previous two
years, 1 digit occupation, a long list of background characteristics, and a number of indicators of the
applicant's motivation to find work.
Women who received a referral found their first job a significant 2.8 weeks earlier than ES
applicants who did not receive a referral and earned 23 percent more during the six month period
following their application to the ES. Remarkably, there was no tendency for men who received a
referral to have higher probabilities of employment. Males who received a referral obtained a first job
about a half a week earlier, but earned 3.7 percent less during the six month period following the
application to ES and were 1.8 percent less likely to be employed at the end of the six month period.
Receiving an ES referral also failed to improve the quality of the job obtained. In fact, point
estimates imply that new registrants who received referrals had slightly lower average wage rates--a 2
percent reduction for men and a 4 percent reduction for women.
JDW argue that these relationships are unbiased estimates of the causal impact of receiving a
referral~ In defending their judgement that applicants with positive unobserved productivity traits
were not more likely to receive a referral, they report that regressions predicting referral receipt found
that "few applicant demographic characteristics and no work history characteristics significantly influence
whether an individual receives a referral."'. This is a surprising result, because employers prefer to hire
experienced workers, so one would expect those with experience to be the first to be referred by ES. If
there is indeed no such relationship, employer complaints that 'the ES does not refer the most qualified
worker possible' may well have some basis in fact.
However one comes out on the issue of selection bias, there is clearly no evidence in the JDW
study that match quality from the worker's point of view (ie. wage rate) was improved by an ES referral.
Furthermore, the presumed finding that being referred to a job raises the probability of employment for
women is considerably less impressive when looked at from a general equilibrium perspective. F"lTstly,it
is quite possible that the comparison group (the 60+ percent of ES applicants who did not get referred),
were made worse off by the process of applying and then being rejected. Being told 'We will check our
list of job openings and call you if you qualify for any of them' and then never receiYin8 a call may have
caused the job seeker to despair of ever rmding a job and end their own self directed search efforts.
Secondly, referred ES applicants may be displacing other job seekers. What would the
employers who hired the ES referrals have done if there had been no ES? Surely, many (probably most)
of these openings would have been filled some other way?
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The Department of Labor is aware of the stigma attached to being an ES referral and has been
experimenting with various ways of improving the services that the Employment Service provides to
employers and job seekers. The remainder of the paper is devoted to an examination of a program
model--VG-GATB--which has been recently implemented in a number of states and promises, if fully
implemented, to substantially change and expand the ES role in the US labor market.
IV. THE VG-GATB BASED REFERRAL SYSTEM:
How Should it be Designed?
-;..
In the computer age, there are substantial economies of scale in the labor exchange function.
Because of its size, the absence of charges for most services and its R&D investments in the VG-GATB
referral system, the Employment Service is the only organization in the country that has the potential of
achieving the scale necessary to achieve these benefits. Achieving this goal requires that the ES grab a
much larger share of the market for labor exchange services. VG-GATB and, in particular, office wide
implementation of VG-GATB represents an effort to remake the reputation of the Employment Service
and regain market share.25 As envisioned by ES staff in 1988, a fully implemented VG-GA TB referral
system would have the following major features~
1) VlI1:uallyall registrants at Employment Service offices would be administered the General
Aptitude Test Battery--a battery of 5 paper and pencil subtests assessing verbal, mathematical,
spatial ability, three subtests assessing perceptual speed, and 4 subtests assessing psychomotor
ab~ties.
2) Virtually all job orders would be filled on the basis of an average of three GA TB composite
scores--general academic ability (GVN), perceptual and spatial ability (SPQ) and psychomotor
skills (KFM). The weights used to calculate the ranking index vary according to which job
family the job falls into.
3) The group of job candidates referred to an employer would be selected on the basis of rank-
ordered test scores (plus any additional criteria such as educational or experience requirements
~
,~
~
imposed by the employer).
4) GA TB scores were to be computed as percentile scores within each of three racial or ethnic
groups--black, Hispanic and other--in order to eliminate adverse impact of rank-ordered
referrals on members of minority groups. [Objections from the Department of Justice to this
feature caused a stalemate for many years. Eventually race-norming of test scores was outlawed
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The combined referral scheme recommended by the National
Academy Committee is an alternative way of reducing adverse impact which does not violate the
law.]
5) Information on registrants and job orders would be computerized.
All jobs handled by the U.S. Employment Service were grouped into five job families based on the data
and things codes contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Validity generalization research was
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the basis for allocating occupations to job families and determining the weights to be assigned each
GA TB composite in the ranking algorithm for each job family.27 For operative jobs involving feeding
and offbearing of machinery, for example, psychomotor skill was assigned a weight of.87 and general
ability was assigned a weight of .13. For the job family at the top of the complexity hierarchy involving
synthesizing and coordinating, only the general academic ability factor was used in the ranking algorithm.
The design of the VG-GA TB referral system was informed by the long tradition in psychology of
research into the measurement of cognitive abilities and of their correlation with job performance. What
do these studies tell us about the ability of various cognitive ability constructs t~ predict job
performance?
.;~
4.1 Ghiselli's Review or Research on the Validity or Cognitive Tests
Over the last 50 years, industrial psychologists have conducted hundreds of studies, involving
many hundreds of thousands of workers, on the relationship between supervisory assessments of job
performance and various predictors of performance. In 1973 Edwin Ghiselli published a compilation of
the results of this research organized by type of test and occupation. Table 6 presents a summary of the
raw validity coefficients (correlation coefficients uncorrected for measurement error and restriction of
range) for six types of tests: mechanical comprehension tests, wintelligencewtests, arithmetic tests, spatial
relations tests, perceptual accuracy tests and psychomotor ability tests. Mechanical comprehension tests
assess material that is covered in physics courses and applied technology courses such as auto mechanics
and carpentry. The 'intelligence' tests used in this research were generally group administered tests
assessing verbal and mathematical competency, not individually administered Wechsler or Stanford-Binet
IQ tests. Consequently they are more properly titled as general academic ability tests.
General academic ability tests were the best predictors of the performance of foreman. For
craft occupations and semi-skilled industrial jobs, the mechanical comprehension tests are more valid
predictors of job performance than any other test category. For protective occupations, mechanical
comprehension tests and general academic ability tests had equal validity. For clerical jobs, the best
predictors of job performance were tests of general academic ability, arithmetic and perceptual accuracy
(1990).
The summary table gives a clear impression that different occupations tap different abilities.
Mechanical comprehension tests are strongly associated with job performance in the blue collar jobs but
not in clerical jobs. Mathematical skills are more important in some occupations than others. Verbal
skills similarly vary in their importance.
It would appear that measures of mathematicaI, verbal and generic technical competence had
substantial effects on job performance in the studies conducted before 1973. The National Academy of
Science report suggested that the ability of the GATB battery to predict job performance appears to be
lower in the studies conducted since 1972. How strong a predictor is the GA TB now? It is to this
question we now must turn.
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4.2 Analysis of Post 1972 GATB Validation Studies
More recent data on what predicts job performance in the civilian sector is available from the
US Employment Service's program for revalidating the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB). This
data set contains data on job performance, the 9 GATB "aptitudes" and background data on 36,614
individuals in 159 different occupations from studies conducted after 1972. Professional, managerial and
high level sales occupations were not studied but the sample is quite representative of the 71,132,000
workers in the rest of the occupational distribution. It ranges from drafters and laboratory testers to
botel clerks and knitting-machine operators.
Since a major purpose of these validation studies was to examine the effects of race and ethnicity
on the validity of the GA TB, the firms tbat were selected tended to bave an integrated workforce in that
occupation. Firms tbat used aptitude tests similar to the GATB for selecting new hires for the job being
studied were excluded. The employment service officials who conducted these studies report that this
last requirement did not result in the exclusion of many firms. A total of 3052 employers participated.
The workers in the study were given the GATB test battery and asked to supply information on
their age, education, plant experience and total relevant work experience. Plant experience was defined
as years working in that occupation for the current employer. Total relevant experience was defined as
years working in tbe occupation for all employers. The dependent variable was an average of two ratings
(generally two weeks apart) supplied by the worker's immediate supervisor. The Standard Descriptive
Rating Scale obtains supervisory ratings of 5 aspects of job performance (quantity, quality, accuracy, job
knowledge and job versatility) as well as an "all around" performance rating. Some studies employed
rating scales specifically designed for that occupation and in one case a work sample was one of the job
performance measures. None of the studies used ticket earnings from a piece rate pay system as the
criterion. Studies whicb used course grades or tests of job knowledge as a criterion were excluded.
Firms with only one employee in the job classification were excluded, as were individuals whose reported
work experience was inconsistent witb their age.
The matbematical achievement index (N) was an average of normalized scores on an arithmetic
reasoning test and on a numerical computations test. Verbal ability was assessed by a vocabulary test.
Perceptual Speed was the sum of the P and Q aptitudes of the GATB divided by 36.72 to put it in a
population SD metric. Psychomotor Ability was tbe sum of the K, F and M aptitudes of tbe GATB
divided by 51.54 to put it in a population SD metric. Tbe GATB does not contain a measure of technical
competence.
Because wage rates, average productivity levels and the standards used to rate employees vary
from plant to plant, mean differences in ratings across establishments have no real meaning. Only
deviations of rated performance (Rmij-Rmj)from tbe mean for the establishment (Rmj) were analyzed.
The variance of the job performance distribution was also standardized across establishments by dividing
(Rm,(Rmj) by the standard deviation of rated performance, (Sq(Rmq), calculated for that firm (or 3 if the
sample SD is less than 3).28 The model that was estimated for each major occupational category was:
Matching Efficiency-IO/17/92 19
(4) Rml~Rml= Po + 131Ct(1J) + P2(~-~) + P3~(~) +P4m(~) + V2
S~( m'j)
where ~j = ratings standardized to have a zero mean and SD of 1.
.1j = a vector of the five GA TB aptitude composites
~ = years of schooling of the r individual.
~j = a vector of age and experience variables--age, age?-,total occupational experience, total
occupational experience?, plant experience and plant experience?
?~1
.-.
~j = a vector of dummy variables for black, Hispanic and female.
lj, ~,~ and
~
are the meansof test composites,schooling,experiencevariablesand race and gender
dummies for the r job/establishment combination. Normalized ratings deviations were predicted by
deviations from the job/establishment's mean for gender, race, Hispanic, age, age squared, plant
experience, plant experience squared, total occupational experience, total occupational experience
squared, schooling and test composites.
It should be recognized that the validity literature in general and this model in particular do not
yield unbiased estimates of the true structural relationships prevailing in the full population. 28 Validity
studies based on eJffimining which job incumbents are most productive are subject to bias for three
reasons: omitted variables, the selection process that determines which new hires were retained by the
firm and the selection process by which members of the population were hired for the job.
While equation 1 is a more complete specifications of the background determinants of job
performance than is typically found in the validity literature, it lacks controls for important characteristics
of the worker which effect worker productivity. Examples of things left out of the model are
occupationally specific schooling, grades in relevant subjects in schoo~ reputation of the schoo~ the
amount and quality of on-the-job training, performance in previous jobs, character traits like reliability
and need to achieve, physical strength and a desire to work in the occupation. Exclusion of these
variables from the model causes the coefficients of included variables to be biased.
The second problem arises from the fact that job performance outcomes have been used to
select the sample used in the analyses. Since incompetent workers were fired or induced to quit and
high performing workers were probably promoted to jobs of a higher classification, the job incumbents
used in this study were a restricted sample of the people originally hired for a job. The systematic
nature of attrition from the job substantially reduces the variance of job performance and biases
coefficients of estimated job performance models toward zero. When all variables are multivariate
normal, the ratio of the coefficients estimated in the selected sample (f3*) to the true coefficient
estimated in an unselected population (f3) is equal to:
(5) 13*/13 = VR/(l-~(l-VR» = VR + R4Il(I-VR)
where VR is the ratio of the variance of y in the selected sample to its variance in the full population, R2
is the multiple coefficient of determination of y on ~ in the full population and R 1102 is the multiple
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coefficient of determination of y on ~ in the selected population.30 Estimates of YR, the ratio of
incumbent job performance variance to new hire job performance variance can be derived from the
NCRVE and NFIB employer surveys.31 Data on the reported productivity in the :Jd through }jh week
(6 months in NFIB data) afrer being hired of two different workers was employed to calculate a variance
ratio by dividing job performance variance of incumbents (pairs of workers both of whom were still at
the fInn at the time of the interview a year or so after being hired) by the job performance variance of a
group of very recent hires (pairs of workers both of whom stayed at least 13 weeks but who mayor may
not have remained at the fIrm through the interview). The resulting estimate of VR was .486 for
NCRVE data and .514 for NFIB data.32 Assuming multi-variate normality, an average VR of.5 and
noting that the ~ of the models in table 8 averages about .137,our estimate of PIp., the multiplier for
transforming the coefficients estimated in the selected sample into estimates of population parameters, is
1.76. The bias arising from selection on the dependent variable is quite large and of great importance in
utility analyses of the effects of selection systems. The National Research Council report on General
Aptitude Test Battery ignored this source of bias in its report
The third source of problems is selection effects introduced by the selection that precedes the
hiring decision. U hiring selections were based entirely on X variables included in the model,
unstandardized coefficients such as P" would be unbiased and correction formulas would be available for
calculating standardized coefficients and validities. Unfortunately, however, incidental selection based on
unobservables such as interview performance and recommendations is very probable:'3 As pointed out
earlier in the discussion of hypothesis Ho(A), in selected samples of new bires, one cannot argue that
these omitted unobservable variables are uncorrelated with the included variables that were used to make
initial hiring decisions and, therefore, that coefficients on included variables are unbiased. When
someone with 10 years of formal schooling is hired for a job that normally requires 12 years of schooling,
there is probably a reason for that decision. The employer saw something positive in that job applicant
(maybe the applicant received a particularly strong recommendation from previous employers) that led to
the decision to make an exception to the rule that new hires should have 12 years of schooling. The
analyst is unaware of the positive recommendations, does not include them in the job performance model
and, as a result, the coefficient on schooling is biased toward zero. This phenomenon also causes the
estimated effects of other worker traits used to select workers for the job such as previous relevant work
experience to be biased toward zero. Variables which were not used to select new bires such as the
GATB test scores will be biased if they are correlated with the unobservable. Mueser and Maloney
(1987) experimented with some plausible assumptions regarding this selection process and concluded that
coefficients on education were severely biased but that coefficients on test scores were not substantially
changed when these incidental selection effects were taken into account,34 Consequently, the biases
that are inevitably present in validity research conducted in the field appear not to result in large over
estimates of the true effect of predictors not used in selection. Estimates of tbe effect of variables tbat
are used in selection are, by contrast, quite often severely biased toward zero. While much can be
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learned about the determinants of job performance from this line of research, results must be interpreted
cautiously with selection effects in mind.
Effects of Aptitude Tests
The results of estimating equation 4 without corrections for the statistical problems just
discussed are presented in Table 7. The GATB aptitudes had substantial effects on supervisory ratings.
Selecting workers who have a one population SO (about 5 grade level equivalents) advantage on both the
mathematical and verbal GA TB aptitudes would, holding the other aptitudes constant, increase predicted
job performance by .23 to .30 of a standard deviation (SO) in technical, clerical and service jobs, by.15
SO in craft jobs and by .12 in operative jobs. Mathematical achievement was clearly the most important
determinant of job performance for all occupational categories except operatives. The effect of
mathematical achievement on the performance of operatives was highly significant but of more modest
size. Verbal ability had no effect on job performance in craft and operative jobs but highly significant
OJ!
1'~
effects on performance as a clerical or service worker.
Spatial ability had significant positive effects on performance of craft occupations and significant
negative effects on performance in high skill clerical occupations. Perceptual speed had small effects on
job performance, but the coefficients are nevertheless significant in all but technical occupations (Where
the sample is relatively small).
Psychomotor skills were significantly related to performance in all occupations but in the better
paid and more complex jobs the magnitude of the effect was only about one-third of that of verbal and
mathematical achievement together. The effect of psychomotor skills was larger in the two least skilled
occupations--operatives and service except police and fire. For operatives the impact of psychomotor
skills was roughly comparable to the impacts of mathematical and verbal achievement. These results are
consistent with previous studies of these and other data sets.35
It is sometimes argued that in Tayloristic work settings, that specific jobs "require" specific
minimum levels of basic skills and that once those thresholds have been reached, there are no
performance benefits to workers having greater levels of basic skill. The 'over education' variant of this
'requirements' view is that too much mathematical and verbal skill causes worker dissatisfaction and this
actually results in lower performance and higher turnover. Both of these views predict a large negative
second derivative on relationships between performance and test scores in Tayloristic work settings like
those used to validate the GA TB. To test these views, models containing squared terms for academic
achievement and psychomotor skills were estimated (not shown). The addition of these two variables did
not significantly reduce the residual variance in 7 of 8 occupations. The exception was the sales clerk
occupation which had large negative second derivatives on both test score variables. For psychomotor
skills, the hypothesis of diminishing returns was accepted at the 10 percent level for operatives, service
workers, sales workers and in the aggregate relationship. The second derivatives are not so large,
however, that the sign of the relationship reverses within the range of actual data. In the aggregate
relationship and for operatives, the derivative of performance with respect to the psychomotor test scores
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at one SD above the mean of the test is 52-57 percent of the derivative when test scores are one SD
below the mean.
For sales clerks the square term on general academic ability is significantly negative. General
academic ability had a positive effect on performance only when the test scores were no more than one-
half a standard deviation above the mean. In other occupations, however, greater academic ability is
associated with better job performance even when academic ability substantially above average. These
results imply that there is an economic case for upgrading the basic skills of the general population even
in a Tayloristic world in which high skill occupations are not growing faster than low skill occupations.
The fact that employment in high skill occupations grows about 2.5 percent per year faster than
employment in low skill occupations and 'high performance' work sites are replacing Tayloristic work
sites just strengthens the case for better preparation in high school
The estimated effects of the GA TB aptitudes on job performance are different in clerical and
blue collar occupations. Verbal abilities are very important in clerical and service jobs but have no effect
on job performance in craft and operative jobs. Spatial Ability is important in craft jobs but not in
clerical jobs. These results imply that workers who are high on perceptual and verbal ability but low on
spatial ability will tend to have a comparative advantage in clerical jobs. Workers who are high in spatial
and mathematical ability but low on verbal ability will have a comparative advantage in craft jobs.
Analysis of military studies of job performance supports the conclusion that it is possible to use test
batteries like the GATB and the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to identify which
occupations particular workers are likely to be particularly good at.3e
The Employment Service's system for referring clients to employers should attempt to maximize the
comparative advantage of the client. The ament VG-GA TB system does not distinguish between
mathematical, verbal and spatial ability and consequently fails to direct workers into occupations in which
they have a high comparative advantage. What is needed, at an absolute minimum, is to expand the cu"ent
three trait summary of the GA TB battery-general academic composite (GVN), perceptual composite (SPQ)
and psychomotor composite (KFM)-into a six trait summary by decomposing general academic ability into
four traits-verbal achievement, mathematical achievement, spatial ability and technical competence.
Occupational competency tests which include a perfonnance component would also be used as well as a
biographical data (biodata) questionnaire assessing work experience in the occupation and affective traits.
Secondly, the number of job families which are presumed to have the same relationship between
GA TB aptitudes and job perfonnance (currently just 5) should be greatly expanded. At a minimum the job
families should distinguish between jobs for which spatial and technical competence is unimportant such as
clerical jobs and jobs for which these capabilities are very important. Another important distinction is
between jobs where mathematical skills are extremely important and verbal skills are not and jobs where
verbal skills are quite important. Separate prediction models would then be estimated for each occupational
category using the richer set of ability constructs and validity would be presumed to generalize within these
job families. The resulting system would look much like the job assignment system cu"ently in use by the
QTmed forces-a system that has no doubt COlttribuced to the professionalism that American troops have
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exhibited in the Persian Gulf. There is much that can be learned from the Joint-SelVice Job Performance
MeasurementjEn/istment Standards Project and this knowledge can and should be applied to the task of
developing an effective ES referral system.37
Schooling:: When test scores were controlled, years of schooling had very small and sometimes
negative effects on job performance in all occupations except technical occupations. Mueser and
Maloney and Weiss and Landau argue persuasively, however, that since schooling is a very important
factor in the selection process, the coefficients on schooling in estimations like these are negatively biased
estimates of true population relationships.38
Effects of Work Experience
Based on an analysis of data from a few large employers with a large number of older
employees, Medoff and Abraham concluded that when job classification is held constant, productivity
declines with age and tenure.311 This analysis of a larger, more representative and younger (mean age
of 33 and SD of 11.2) data set obtains different results. Both occupational experience (mean of 6.9 yrs
and SD of 7.4) and tenure in the specific job (mean of 5 yrs and SD of 5.93 yrs) had quite substantial
positive effects on job performance in all occupations throughout the range of data. The negative
coefficients on the square terms imply, of course, that both occupational experience and tenure in a
narrowly defmed job are subject to diminishing returns. Estimates of the turn around point are
imprecise, but appear to be rather high. The performance enhancing effect of tenure in the narrowly
defined job peaks out at somewhere between 16 and 24 years. The positive effect of occupational
experience does not drop to zero until 37 years of experience for operatives, 55 years for craft workers
and high skill clerical workers and 19-31 years for other occupations.
Relative to someone with no relevant work experience, a worker with 5 years of relevant work
experience is predicted to be slightly more than 50 percent of an SD more productive in the first year on
the job and about 33 percent of an SD more productive in the fifth year on the job. Because
occupational experience was probably used to select new hires for the job, the true effect of previous
occupational experience is almost certainly larger than that estimated in this regression. The productivity
gain from hiring a worker with 5 years of occupational experience is thus substantially larger than the
gain resulting from hiring a worker who is one population standard deviation (about 5 grade level
equivalents) higher in verbal and mathematical ability.
Except for technicians, age has large curvilinear effects on job performance as well. Holding
tenure and occupational experience constant, age had a significant positive effect on job performance in
all except technical occupations. In these occupations, twenty year olds with no experience at all in the
field were 7.2 to 10.3 percent of an SD more productive than 18 year olds with no experience in the field.
Thirty year olds with no occupational experience were 4.7 to 7.4 percent of an SD more productive than
28 year olds with no experience in the field.
The substantial effects of age and previous occupational experience on job performance are
consistent with current hiring practices which give important weight to previous work experience.
McDaniel, Schmidt and Hunter's meta analysis supports this conclusion, as well. They found that
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assessments of the amount and relevance of an individual's previous work experience are a valid
predictor of job performance;40 Ratings of experience using the behavioral consistency method
appeared to have the greatest validity. These results suggest that a job applicant who has age and
relevant work experience in their favor but low test scores will quite often be preferable to a young
applicant who has high test scores but no relevant work experience. This is particularly likely to be the
case for high turnover occupations (which the ES often makes referrals for) because the productivity
benefits of age and pr~vious relevant work experience are large initially but diminish with time on the
job. This finding has profound effects on how an ES referral system should be designed.
Incorporatin, WorlcExperience Assessment into VG-GATB: It is extremely important that ES
referrals be based on previous experience in the occupation (or a closely related one) and the total amount
of worlc experience plus aptitude test scores and not on aptitude test scores alone. The referral system in
place prior to VG-GATB was built almost entirely around matching the workers specific skills and
experience to the specific needs of employers. In its initial conception, the VG-GATB system was not
going to take previous occupational experience into account in the referral process (Hawk et al. 1986).
Employers were, however, allowed to specify a minimum level of occupational experience requirement to
be used as a screening criterion prior to the implementation of the GATB referral process and almost all
employers chose to do so. Some have been highly specific about their work experience requirements
asking only for people who have used a particular machine in past jobs or worked in a particular 9 digit
DOT occupation in the past. Others have been more general, asking only for X years of experience in
clerical jobs or Y years of experience in industrial jobs. Employers are also able to make two step
requests: for example, "Please refer typists who know WordPerfect, but if none are available please refer
typists with some experience with word processing."
Employers should be encouraged to continue to specify skill and occupational experience
requirements. This, however, is not sufficient. Occupational experience assessment must also be an integral
part of the VG-GA TB matching algorithm. Under the cwrent VG-GA TB system, the worlc experience
screening criterion selected by the employer will generally leave a large pool of eligibles who have varying
amounts of relevant occupational experience. In a system based solely on test scores, applicants with
considerable relevant worlc experience would not have higher probabilities of being referred. Including worlc
experience in the ranking algorithm for making refe"als also improves the face validity and fairness of the
refemz/ system. Incorporating previous occupational experience into the refemz/ process is too important a
goal to be left to idiosyncratic specifications of employer job orders. The system must be sl1UCtured so that
worlcers with a substantial amount of experience in an occupation are the first to be referred to job openings
in that field even when test scores are low.
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v. THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF INCREASED USE OF THE
GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY FOR EMPWYEE SELECTION
The evidence just reviewed clearly establishes that it will generally be in a company's interest to
use employment tests as one of the factors in making decisions about whom to hire. Since, however, the
top quality worker who is identified by an employment test and hired by company A is not available to
company B or C, the gain to company A may be partially or wholly offset by the loss to other firms.
When such offsets are taken into account, how large would the social benefits of greater use of
employment tests be?
5.1 Estimating the Social Benefits of Selecting New Hires on the Basis of
GATB Scores and Relevant Work Experience
Greater use of employment aptitude tests increases aggregate output when:
. Different occupations require different abilities, tests are available to measure these different
abilities and selection is based on prediction models which take into account the unique skill
needs of particular occupations,
. Tests are more valid predictors of job performance in some jobs than others or
. Improvements in job performance measured in standard deviation units have larger effects on
output valued in dollars in some occupations than others.
Hunter and Schmidt (1982) have published an estimate of the social benefits of extensive use of
employment tests using an approach called utility analysis..1 Utility analysis starts with the assumption
that the Il. and the ~ of equation 1 are equal. If this is the case, one can use estimates of the within-job
relationship between job performance and worker traits such as occupational experience and
mathematical ability to predict changes in the average productivity of groups of workers (a firm or an
occupation) as the mean 'quality' of workers in the group changes. They employed Brogden's formula to
calculate the effect of test use on the efficiency of the economy's matching of workers to jobs;42 In this
context, Brogden's formula can be viewed as a way of representing for a specific job the derivative of a
worker's true productivity (In measured in dollars with respect to a test score (1;):
(6) 81:
-81;
Cov(~T.1;)
Var(1;) -
SD(pT)
rTISD(T)
where COV(~T,1; = the covariance of true productivity and the test in an unselected sample.
Var(1;) = the population variance of the test.
rTP = true validity, the correlation between true productivity in that job and the test when
employees are randomly selected.
SD(pT)
= the standard deviation of output in dollars if the workers had been randomly selected.
SD(T) = the population standard deviation of the test.
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They pointed out that tests are more valid predictors of job performance (eg. have higher rTP)in the
more complex jobs that are traditionally better paid and, therefore, probably also have larger standard
deviations of productivity in a dollar metric, SD(pT). When this is the case, output will increase if high
scoring individuals are recruited into the most complex jobs and low scoring individuals are recruited into
the less complex jobs. They made a simplifying assumption that the ratio of the standard deviation of
output in dollars to the wage was the same in all jobs but argued that it was quite large, about 40 percent
of compensation. Under this assumption, they calculate that distributing all workers across four major
occupational categories on the basis of a single measure of academic ability would raise productivity 4
percent above the level resulting from random assignment of workers to major occupational category.
They also reported that assigning workers on the basis of a simple multivariate selection model involving
tests of perceptual speed and spatial ability as well as academic ability would increase productivity by 8
percent relative to random ass~ment.43
However, since people are already recruited into high status jobs on the basis of years of
schooling, college major, grades, previous work experience and pedormance in past jobs (which together
explain much of the variance of test scores), greater use of tests by employers would have smaller effects
on national output than those calculated by Hunter and Schmidt.
The National Research Council (NRe) Committee on the GATB has criticized the H-S
estimates on four additional grounds. rlfst, their review of the validity literature led them to lower
estimates of true validity than the ones employed by U-S. GATB validity studies conducted since 1972
have found lower validities particularly for psychomotor skills than the earlier studies upon which HIS
based their simulation. They also felt that U-S's adjustment for restriction of range was too large.
Second, they were dubious about the assumption that SD(P) is 40 percent of mean compensation and
used instead an assumption of 20 percent. A third source of bias, in their view, is something that
psychologists call criterion contamination--the possibility that errors in measuring productivity on the job
are positively correlated with test scores, and that consequently the estimates of true validity and the
standard deviation of true output may be too large. rmally, they felt that tests would not be used by all
firms, for all jobs and optimally in every case, so the full benefits calculated would never be realized.
Using our preferred parameters--validity of .2 and the standard deviation of productivity
on a job is 20 percent of output on that job--their univariate model suggests that
improved job matching would increase the GNP by about 1.1 percent; the multivariate
model suggests an increase of 2.1 percent.44
Hunter and Schmidt acknowledge that the current distribution of workers across jobs is not random. On
the other hand, they argue that some of the other assumptions of their calculation not criticized by the
NRC--that coefficients of variation of productivity are the same for all occupations, only three test score
composites would be used to rematch workers and only 4 categories of occupations need to be
distinguished-- bias their estimates toward zero.
Despite their disagreements on specifics, the NRC committee viewed:
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...the economy wide matching models as a promising way to assess the economic effects
of testing. By looking beyond a single job they offer the Employment Service a device
for balancing the demands of all employers and all applicants;45
This section of the paper attempts to move this debate along a step or two by fixing as many of the
problematic assumptions as possible and then redoing H-S and the NRC Committee's calculations. The
objective is an improved estimate of the magnitude of the matching efficiency gains that may result from
greater test use, net a definitive estimate. In the current state of knowledge, a defmitive estimate is
infeasible for some important sources of bias cannot be eliminated. There is no way of knowing, for
example, how effectively tests will be incorporated into selection decisions and whether the measurement
errors of job performance are correlated with test sCores or not, so it will not be possible to formally
address two of the NRC Committee's objections to H-S's estimates.
We saw in the previous section that different occupations appear to require different abilities
and that test validity varies across occupations. The simulation exercise conducted in this section of the
paper is based on empirically validated models of job performance similar to those presented in section
4.2. The models are estimated in the post 1972 GATB validation data that the NRC Committee says
yields lower estimates of validity than those used by H-S. Relative job performance ratings are a
function of three (not five) tests score composites (general academic achievement, perceptual speed and
psychomotor skills), years of schooling, age, total occupational experience, tenure, gender, race and
Hispanic background for 8 different occupational categories in the United States Employment Service's
General Aptitude Test Battery Revalidation Individual Data FIle. Because it is illegal for firms to select
workers on the basis of gender, race or ethnicity, these variables were excluded from the model used to
simulate the assig11ment of workers to occupations. Workers were assigned to jobs on the basis of
performance predictions generated by estimates of equation 4a.
(4a) lC,-RmJ = R.J =Po + fJ1a,-lj) + P2(~-~) + P3C&~) + v2
sq(Rmq)
(4b)
~ = Po + P1(I;,-lj) + P2(S~-~) + P3C&-lSj) + P4m,-~) + V2
where 1;j = a vector of the three GATB aptitude composites
The calculation of the effects of using GATB scores to reassign workers to occupations on aggregate
output will be based on the predictions of Model4b, a model which does include dummies for gender,
race and Hispanic.
The next step is a review of the literature on how variable output is across workers doing the
same job and how this variability differs across jobs. These results are presented in section 5.2 The
major finding here is that the standard deviation of output is substantially higher in the more cognitively
complex and better paid jobs (supporting H-S's claim that at least in this respect their method of
estimating matching gains is conservative).
In section 53 the effect of alternative ways of assigning workers to jobs is calculated by
simulating such changes in the USES Individual Data File after reweighting it to be representative of all
workers outside of professional, managerial and sales representative occupations. The parameters of the
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"structural" models are used to predict the productivity (in standard deviation units) during the fIrst ten
years on the job of all 31,399 workers in the data set in each of the 8 occupational categories analyzed.
The mean predicted productivity of workers who currently occupy each job is then compared to the
productivity that would result from (1) a random assignment of new hires to jobs and (2) a rematching
new hires to jobs based on the productivity predictions generated by regression equations similar to the
structural models but absent data on gender, race and Hispanic background. These results are then
translated into a dollar !Detric by multiplying changes in mean productivity in standard deviation units by
estimates of the sl~dard deviation of productivity in dollars obtained from the literature review. Impacts
on the gender, racial, and Hispanic composition of each occupation are also simulated and discussed.
Section 5.4 then concludes with a critique of the estimated "structural" models of job performance and
the resulting estimates of productivity gains from rematching the workforce on the basis of employment
tests and relevant occupational experience.
S.2 A REVIEW OF STUDIES OF OUTPUT VARIABILI1Y
.;~~
A crucial determinant of the payoff to using tests to select workers is the extent of the variability
across workers in their productivity on the job. A search for studies of output variability yielded 49
published and 8 unpublished papers covering 94 distinct jobs. Recent reviews of the literature on SD$ by
Boudreau (1990) and Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch (1988) were the source of most of the data. The
results are summarized in columns 1.3 of table 9.46(The detailed results are reported in Tables 1-4 in
Appendix D). Most of the studies reviewed measured physical amounts of output produced over periods
generally lasting one to four weeks and report a ratio of the standard deviation of output to mean output,
coefficient of variation or CV. Relative output levels vary over time, so coefficients of variation for a one
or fIve year period are inevitably smaller than the coefficients of variation for a one or two week period.
Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch (1988) review a number of studies which provide evidence on the
correlation between output levels over time and how these correlations vary with the length of the time
interval studied. This information was then used to construct estimates of the output CVs for periods of
a year or more. It is these corrected estimates of the CV which are reported. For semi-skilled factory
jobs paid on an hourly basis the coefficient of variation averaged about 14 percent. Output variability is
greater in the higher paid technical and precision production jobs. The coefficient of variation averages
27.6 percent in craft jobs and 33.8 percent in technical jobs.
Clerical jobs were divided into high skill and low skill categories. The description of the job in
the Dictionary of Occuoational Titles was reviewed and jobs which appeared to require greater skill or
involve discretion and decision making were classifIed as "high skill clerical." The jobs which were
included in this category were stenographer, computer operator, administrative clerk, supply specialist,
claims processor, head teller, ticket agent, customer service representative and teacher aide. Jobs
categorized as "routine" were key punch operator, hotel clerk, cashier-checker, telephone operator, mail
carriers, me clerks, stock clerk, typists, and toll ticket sorters. This distinction appears to be a real one
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for the high skill clerical jobs were generally better paid than the routine clerical jobs and the workers in
these jobs scored one third of a standard deviation higher on the GA TB academic achievement
composite than those who occupied the more routine clerical jobs. Furthermore, the variability of job
performance appears to be substantially greater in the jobs that require decision making. The coefficient
of variation was 25.5 in the high skill clerical jobs and 16.7 percent in the routine jobs.
Data was available for only three service occupations. These three jobs represent too small a
sample to produce reliable estimates of the CV for all service jobs except police and fire fighting so the
estimate of the service CV employed in the paper is an unweighted average of the CVs for operatives,
low skill clerical workers and 20.6, the average for the three service jobs for which there is data on the
variability of output. For sale clerks records of sales transactions were employed to calculate the CV and
the result was an estimate of 29.8 percent.
When a firm expands by hiring extra workers, it incurs significant fixed costs. It must rent space,
buy equipment, hire supervisors and recruit, hire, train, and payroll the additional production workers. H
output can be ina-eased by hiring more competent workers, all of these costs can be avoided and the
,
firm's capital becomes more productive. These factors tend to magnify the effects of work force quality
on productivity. They imply that the ratio of the standard deviation of worker productivity in dollars
(SDS) to average worker compensation is much larger than the productivity CV for that job~7
Estimates of productivity standard deviations (SD$) in 1985 dollars are reported in column 2 of
the table 9. In most cases the author of the study made no attempt to estimate SDS's, so estimates of
SDS were derived as a product of the CV, the mean compensation for that job and 1.52, the ratio of
value added to compensation for private non-farm business excluding mining, trade, finance and real
estate. The value added to compensation ratio in retailing and in real estate is much too high to be used
as an adjustment factor. So for all sales occupations, it was assumed that SDS = CV times average
compensation. The SD$ that result are $13,668 for technicians, S12,399 for a-aft workers, $5062 for
semiskilled factory jobs, $8925 for high-skill clerical jobs, $4934 for routine clerical jobs, S4068 for service
workers other than police and fire fighters and S5228 for sales clerks. While it is possible to debate the
accuracy of specific estimates and the reliability of the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentile method of
measuring SDS, the basic pattern of rapidly increasing standard deviations of output as one moves up the
occupational distribution is unlikely to be disturbed by new data or a revised methodology.
What about jobs where capital equipment controls the pace of work? It has been argued that in
automated continuous process industries the amount and quality of output is determined by technology
and computer programs not by the skills and talents of the workers. In fact, however, programs cannot
be written to handle all contingencies and machines are never completely reliable so human operators
have an important role to play.48 In capital intensive industries with high rates of energy and materials
consumption, small errors can cause substantial losses. Small adjustments which increase fuel efficiency
can save a utility or refmery millions of dollars a week. This has been demonstrated by a very careful
study of the variability of the job performance of the operators of electric utility plants(see Appendix
Table D2). In the study of the operators of electric generating plants commissioned by the Edison
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Electric Institute, committees of technical experts were organized and asked to make consensus estimates
of the frequency and costs of the most common types of operator errors. Once the relationship between
specific operator errors and the purchase costs of replacement power was established, the experts
estimated what would be expected (in dollar terms) from an operator at the 15th, 50th and 85th
percentile of job performance. The study concluded that the standard deviation for the productivity of
control room operators is about $278,000 in 1985 dollars at nuclear plants and $115,000 at fossil fuel
plants.48 When the results of Wroten's study of output variability among refinery operators is combined
with the results of the Dunnette et al study, the estimated SD$ for this small but very important set of
jobs is $91,020. The SD$ of plant operators is more than 6 times larger than any of the other
occupations in the USES Individual Data Fde. As a result, rematching to maximize total output implies
that workers who would be above average producers in all occupations should be assigned to this
occupation.
.\~.
5.3 SIMULATION RESULTS
The question posed in this subsection is "What will happen to aggregate output and to the
gender and ethnic composition of various occupations, if most firms use the GA TB measures of general
academic ability, perceptual speed and psychomotor skills to select new hires?" To simulate the effect of
changes in the allocation of workers across jobs on aggregate output, one needs structural estimates of
the effects of GA TB test scores and other worker characteristics on worker productivity for different job
families. If the data were available, we would want to estimate, for random samples of the population,
linear regressions in which the true relative productivity in dollars, ~T(pTJ' of the ith worker in the jth job
is a function of the worker's characteristics. Unfortunately, the only indicators of productivity are
supervisory ratings which are not dermed on a ratio scale and have only limited reliability and selection
into the sample was defInitely not random.
I~ however, outside estimates of the standard deviation of true productivity among job
incumbents, SDj(PITj)'are available and assumptions are made about the measurement error in these
ratings and about selection effects, estimates of the effect of test scores on true productivity in that
occupation can be derived from regression models in which ratings are predicted by test scores and other
worker characteristics. The measurement assumptions implicitly made by Hunter and Schmidt are:
Rm -Rm - pT _pT(7) Rq =
~~Rm,:) = \/rpp fSq(~~)] + v
where rpp = the reliability of supervisory ratings (eg. the correlation between independent ratings
by two different supervisors in the selected sample of job incumbents).
SDj(PITj) = the standard deviation of true productivity in the selected sample of incumbents in job OJ".
v is uncorrelated with true productivity.
In other words, the ratings of relative job performance are assumed to be cardinal measures of
productivity that are linearly related to true productivity and that errors in assessing productivity are
Matching Efficiency-l0j17j92 31
"
negatively associated with true productivity (and therefore also negatively correlated with test scores).
This assumption implies that measurement error in the dependent variable biases unstandardized
coefficients towards zero. Since the upper bound on the reliability of job performance measures like the
Standard Descriptive Rating Scale appears to be .6,rJIJH-S calculates the impact of a right hand side
variable on true productivity in standard deviation units by multiplying raw validity coefficients by 1.29,
the inverse of the square root of criterion reliability. It is further assumed that sq<Pq) is equal to the
SD~, the standard deviation of productivity in donars discussed in section 5.2.
While thebe assumptions seem reasonable to some, others disagree. There do not appear to be
any studies which have demonstrated that errors in assessing job performance are negatively correlated
with true productivity, so I will assume no correlation and therefore make no correction for criterion
unreliability. There are a few studies establishing the reasonableness of the assumption that sq<P.) =
SD~, so I will adopt that assumption~1 If H-S's adjustments for criterion unreliability had been used,
predicted impacts on output would have been 29 percent larger.
The second problem that must be dealt with is the downward bias that results from the fact that
incompetent workers are fired and high performing workers are promoted to jobs of a higher
classification. The restriction of range adjustments adopted by both H-S and the NRC committee are
inadequate. The problem is selection on the dependent variable, not selection on the independent
variable. One cannot estimate how much the variance of the criterion has been reduced by selective
attrition by comparing test score variances in selected and unselected populations-the approach adopted
by H-S and the NRC committee. As already discussed, this bias is corrected for by multiplying all
coefficients by 1.76.
The reader is reminded that while these corrections deal with some bias problems, others
remain, so even with these corrections the simulations presented below are not definitive. The likely
effects of the biases that remain will be discussed after the simulation results are presented.
The Productivity Loss from Random Assignment of Workers to Jobs
The first simulation exercise is a comparison of the mean predicted productivity of workers who
currently occupy each job to the productivity that would result from a random assignment of new hires to
jobs. The parameters of the equation 4b model were used to predict the productivity (m standard
deviation units) during each of the first ten years on the job of all 31,399 workers in the data set in each
of the 8 occupational categories analyzed.
(8) l\t = PjJ; + pps. + PplS. + P~ + Cj
where ~ 't = a vector of age and total occupational experience variables:
(age. - tenureq + t), (age. -tenur~ + ft,
(total occupational experienceq -tenur~ + t), and
(total occupational experienceq - tenur~ + tf.
tenure.j = the plant experience of the ih worker in the Jh job/establishment at the time
of the GA TB study.
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t = time since being hired. It ranges from 0 to 10.
total occupational experience; - tenUrt;. is the worker's experience in the occupation prior to
coming to work at the establishment. lr the worker is reassigned to a different broad
occupational category, this previous occupational experience is set at zero.
The effects of age and previous occupational experience at the time of hire were included along with test
scores, schooling, gender and ethnicity. An annualized present discounted value of each worker's
predicted productivity during the first ten year~ was then calculated under the assumption of a 6 percent
real interest rate and a monthly turnover rate of 1 percent (which yields a yearly retention rate of .8869).
8.5 8.5
(9) APVij = E ~(.8869/1.06y/ E (.8869/1.061
t-.5 t-.15
.
'~_.
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Based on occupation, race and Hispanic status, each worker was assigned a weight so that the USES
Individual Data File would become representative of all 71,132,000 workers in these 8 occupations. The
weighted mean annualized present value of predicted productivity resulting from random assigJIment of
new hires to occupations was then subtracted from the weighted mean annualized present value of
predicted productivity during the first ten years on the job for the current set of individuals in that
occupation. This was then translated into dollars by multiplying first by 1.76 and then by the SD~ for
that occupation.
The results of this simulation exercise are presented in Table 9. The loss in productivity that
would result from random assignment of workers to jobs is estimated to be about $1407 dollars per
worker per year or 6.2 percent of mean compensation. The aggregate yearly loss is $100 billion in 1985
dollars. The reductions in productivity primarily occur because: (1) workers who had higher than
average productivity during their early years at the firm due to previous experience in the occupation are
often randomly assigned to an occupation where this previous experience is of no value and (2) workers
with high test scores are m\!ch less likely to be assigned to high skill jobs which use their talents than is
the case currently. These results are clearly an extreme lower bound estimate of the benefits (relative to
random assignment) of the current process of matching workers to jobs. If other worker characteristics
such as occupationally specific education, tastes and talents for particular occupations and performance in
previous similar jobs had been included in the model, estimates of productivity loss resulting from
random assignment of workers to occupations would have been substantially greater.
The Productivitv Gains from Re-Sorting Workers on the Basis of Test Scores
The effect of greater use of employment tests to select workers on productivity was explored by
simulating the effects of reassigning new hires on the basis of the productivity predictions derived from
equation 4a. An annualized present discounted productivity (averaged over the first ten years on the job)
was calculated for each worker in each occupation. The reassignment scheme employed a variant of the
"cutand fit"or successive selection technique.52 The 8 occupations were arrayed in a hierarchy
according to the magnitude of the dollar change in productivity that results from a unit change in
academic achievement. Plant operators were at the top of the hierarchy. The computer program sorted
all workers by the present discounted value of their predicted productivity as plant operators (based on
...1
"<
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equation 4a, the model that excludes dummy variables for race, Hispanic and gender) and then assigned
just enough people from the top of that ranking to fill all 228,000 of the nation's plant operator jobs.
The remaining workers were then sorted by their productivity in technical occupations and those found at
the top of the ranking were assigned to these occupations until all 5,261,000 technical jobs were filled.
This procedure was repeated next for craft jobs, then for high skill clerical jobs, for low skill clerical jobs,
for service jobs, and for operative jobs. Those left over after operatives were selected became sales
clerks.S3
,.
The simulated productivity effects of hiring workers on the basis of test scores and previous
occupational experience are presented in column 7 and 8 of Table 9. Output rises by $1208 per worker
per year or by 53 percent of mean compensation. The total gain from applying this plan to the 71
million workers represented in the data base is $86 billion per year. There are major improvements in
the productivity of plant operators, technicians and craft workers which more than offset large declines in
the productivity of operatives and sales clerks.54
The Social Cost of Testinr
The testing is costly, however, so the net benefits of greater testing will be somewhat smaller.
The firm's costs are generally assumed to be about $10.00 per administration. The tests generally take 3
hours to take, so I will assume that the value of the job applicant's time is $24.00 on average. H each
employer were to do its own testing and to test 10 applicants for every position filled, the total yearly
costs of the testing would be $8.0 billion [.36.10.$34.(71,132,000-5,682,000) assuming a monthly new hire
rate of 3 percent into non temporary jobs and no testing of sales clerks].
An alternative approach which reduces the testing burden would have labor market
intermediaries or testing organizations (eg. the Employment Service, private employment agencies, the
Educational Testing Service) administer the battery of employment tests and then report the scores to
potential employers when requested by the worker. Twenty seven percent of the work force change jobs
in a year (Horvath 1981). H each job changer were to take 2 tests on average and one tenth of those
with more than one year of tenure were tested yearly as well, the total yearly costs of testing would be
$1.5 billion [$34(.27.2+.73..1).71,132,000]. The projected social costs of administering the tests,
therefore, probably lie somewhere between 2 and 10 percent of the projected social benefits.
The Distributional Effects of Resortinr on the Basis of Test Scores
The simulated effect of the reas.<;.igramentscheme on the mean test scores, schooling and
demographic character of each occupation is presented in the even numbered columns of Table 10. The
characteristics of those who are currently in each occupation are presented in the odd numbered
columns. Currently workers in technical and high skill clerical occupations have the highest academic
achievement and operatives and service workers have the lowest. The simulation results in the workers
with the strongest academic achievement being reassigned to plant operator, technical and craft
occupations and the workers with the weakest academic achievement being reassigned to operative and
sales clerk occupations.
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Reassigning workers on the basis of test scores, age and previous work experience but not
gender or ethnicity (totally eliminating affIrmative action in the process) would produce large changes in
the demographic composition of some occupations. Women end up with a large share of the plant
operator and craft jobs.55 Occupational segregation of female workers in low paid jobs is just about
eliminated and this dramatically raises their wage. Wages rise by 13 t/ercent for women but fall5. ~
percent for men. The gain for women is larger than the loss for men because aggregate productivity has
risen by.63 percent of aggregate compensation.
In effect, the simulation assumes that all affirmative action programs designed to give under
represented minorities hiring preference or even the benefit of the doubt are canceled. For affirmative
action and the other selection strategies now being used, it substitutes a criterion of "select the person
with the highest predicted productivity based on test scores, schooling. age and work experience". This
radical change in selection criteria has two offsetting effects on minority workers. The first effect is that
minority representation decreases in plant operator, techni~ craft, clerical and service occupations and
increases in operative and sales clerk occupations. Changes in the occupational composition of the
Hispanic work force are smaller, but in the same direction. The relative wage of minority workers
declines OJ..odestly,but the gain for all workers is larger; so the absolute wage levels of minority workers
Sl~h+.:&. decr . th la . f .. k' all beca . bing . .go u~ e me mere tive wage 0 mmonty wor ers 15sm use switc mmonty
workers from higher status to a lower status occupations has only modest effects on mean wage rates
because technician and craft workers are paid only 10 to 20 percent more than operatives and these
differentials are assumed not to change.
The negative effects of top-down referral using unadjusted test scores on the occupational
distn'bution of minorities would be much more certain and visible than possible positive effects on
average wage rates, so these simulations suggest that it would be unwise to combine an end to
affirmative action with expanded use of employment tests for selection. The NRC committee came to
the same conclusion.
Comparison with Other Estimates
How do these results compare to those of Hunter and Schmidt and the NRC Committee on the
GATB? The estimated total effect of going from random selection of new hires to optimal use of tests,
age and previous work experience is 11.5 percent of the compensation of workers subject to .
reassignment. The comparable number for the three test score selection model is 8 percent in the H-S
calculation and 2.1 percent for the NRC committee. My structural models were estimated in the same
data set that the NRC used to calculate validity and the same assumption Was made about the correlation
between measurement error in job performance and true performance, so these features of their critique
of H-S do not account for the discrepancy between my 11.5 and there 2.1. My estimates are higher than
their's because: (a) the estimates of differences in SDS across occupations developed in Appendix Dare
much larger than the one's they assumed, (b) the restriction of range correction (which was based on
actual data on the reductions in job performance variance resulting from the selective nature of turnover)
is dramatically larger than the one they assumed, (c) job assignment was based on a composite of test
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scores, schooling, age and previous occupational work experience that has greater validity than test scores
alone and (d) 8 rather than 4 occupational categories were analyzed.
.~~
5.4 A Critique of the Simulations
The simulation results just presented are based on a maintained assumption that the models of
relative job performance described in section 5.3 (which were estimated in samples of job incumbents)
are, after the correction for the selective nature of turnover (ie. restriction of range), unbiased estimates
of true population relationships. We have already pointed out that the underlying performance model is
probably biased by omitted variables and the selection process that determines which members of the
population are hired for the job. What effect do these biases have on the simulations?
Controls were lacking for worker characteristics which are often known by hiring decision
makers and which are associated with worker productivity. Oearly, if random as.qgJ'ment of new hires to
jobs involved ignoring all of this additional information as well as information on schooling and years of
experience in the occupation, the loss in productivity would be substantially larger than the numbers
reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9.
The omission of many important determinants of job performance also biases the simulations of
the impact of greater test use. If these variables had been included in the job performance models, the
coefficients on test scores would probably have been smaller and adding test scores to the factors
considered in hiring selections would have resulted in fewer workers being reassigned. This in turn
reduces the output gain that results nom greater use of employment tests for selection and exaggerates
the predicted changes in demographic composition of occupational work forces.
The other source of problems is selection effects. The selectivity bias caused by turnover and
promotion decisions that depend on realized levels of job performance has already been discussed and
corrected for. It is the selectivity bias introduced by the selection that precedes the hiring decision which
causes further problems. For the reasons discussed in the previous section, this prior selection causes
our simulations to exaggerate the predicted effects of greater use of the GA TB. If the simulations had
been conducted using the true structural model of job performance rather than the biased one that was
available, fewer people would have been reassigned and productivity gains would have been smaller.
Still another limitation of the simulations is that they took no account of turnover risks and
training cost savings. The large effects of tenure on the productivity of plant operators, technicians and
aaft workers implies that specific training is particularly important in these occupations and that
minimi7:ing turnover should be an important goal of a firm's hiring selections. Nord and Scmitz's
simulation of the effect of optimal assignment of a given pool of army recruits to jobs based on the
ASVAB concluded that much of the benefit arose from training cost reductions due to reduced attrition.
In their study total savings during the first term of enlistment were 24 percent of the compensation
received by the soldiers and 7.8 percent of the sum of compensation and training costS.57
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Greater use of employment tests is not the same thing as greater use of a three composite
summary of the GATB. If, as recommended earlier, spatial, mathematical and verbal ability were
distinguished in the matching algorithm and technical and advanced mathematical subtests were added to
the GA TB, there would be a substantial increase in validity and classification efficiency (eg. workers with
a strong technical background would be assigned to craft jobs rather than clerical jobs and workers
strong in math and English but weak in the technical arena would be assigned to clerical jobs). If a fully
optimal sorting routine had reassigned workers across 100 occupations on the basis of a test battery with
separate verbal, mathematical, spatial and technical ability QSwell a perceptual speed and psychomotor
ability, the matching efficiency gains would have been considerably larger than those simulated. These
different abilities are not all that highly correlated and studies of the classification problem in the military
find that important increases in utility result when recruits are optimally assigned to jobs on the basis of
a test battery like the ASVAB.
On the other hand, the NRC Committee is correct when it argues that there are many barriers
to the complete reshuffling of the work force that would be necessary for employment testing to have its
maximum effect (the effect that is simulated in Table 10 and column 7 and 8 of Table 9. If a number of
worker aptitudes are to be reliably measured, at least three hours of testing is required. This imposes a
burden that is likely to result in some low wage industries eschewing testing altogether. The simulation
model did not ask the workers who were being transferred whether they wanted the "better" jobs which
sometime did not pay more than other jobs for which they would have been competitive. Many would
have refused. The simulation ends gender segregation of occupations and makes wholesale transfers of
clerical workers to plant operator and craft jobs. Improved structural models (eg. adding a mechanical
comprehension test and constructing separate mathematics and spatial ability composites) would reduce
the magnitude of these shifts, but even more modest shifts would be difficult to pull off. Continuing
rather than canceling affIrmative action reduces efficiency gains by 10 to 20 percent;a Consequently,
the likely productivity benefits and rematching effects of allowing employers a free hand with regard to
employment testing are substantially smaller than those presented in Table 9 and 10.
Nevertheless, the simulations imply that the improvements in the matching of workers to jobs
resulting from increased employment testing will significantly increase output. The 53 percent figure
might fall to 2 percent of employee compensation once one takes the biases and the barriers to universal
adoption of employment testing into account. On the other hand, taking constraints off the use of tests
will also reduce tryout hiring and turnover and increase investment in specific human capital. These
effects were not part of the simulations. Since total compensation of labor exceeded $3 trillion in 1988,
applying the 2 percent estimate to the nation's entire workforce implies that the productivity gain from
unconstrained employment testing would eventually increase gross national product by about 60-70 billion
dollars per year or about 1.3 percent of GNP. These effects would not arrive suddenly for the tests only
influence hiring decisions. Current employees would not be fired and replaced by new hires selected on
the basis of tests because the gains from better selection will seldom be sufficient to justify firing
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employees who have developed firm specific skills. It would, therefore, be a decade before the full effect
of testing on the allocation of workers to jobs would be realized.
s.s Integrating VG-GATB with Affirmative Action
The National Research Council's Committee on the General Aptitude Test Battery
recommended that ES continue to use scoring adjustments for blacks and Hispanics. This
recommendation was not based on a finding that the GATB was biased. To the contrary, they concluded
that:
The use of a regression equation based on the combined group of black and
nonminority workers would generally not give predictions that are biased against blacks.
Insofar as the total-group equation gives systematically different predictions, it is
somewhat more likely to overpredict the performance of blacks than to underpredict.1i8
'\'
~'.
The fundamental cause of adverse impact (lower proportions of minorities being selected for desirable
jobs) is the poor quality of the education received by minority children and the principle of hiring those
with the highest predicted job performance, not the use of a "biased" test. The gap in reading and math
between black and white students has been cut nearly in half, but achievement gaps among adults are not
likely to be eliminated for many decades. Other selection criteria-interviews, job knowledge tests, typing
tests, previous work experience--also have this effect, but adverse impacts are larger when tests influence
selection hence the focus on cognitive tests. The NRC committee noted that minority status is more
highly correlated with test scores than with supervisory ratings, so using tests for selection without any
adjustment would result in the proportion of minorities selected for referral to a job being substantially
below the minority share of "successful" employees, if all applicants had been given a chance to show
their stuff. Asking themselves, "Is this fair?", they answered "... we think not..eo
The VG-GA TB Referral System will be viable only if it includes some kind of
adjustment minority scores, so long as the government is committed to a policy of equal
employment opportunity that looks to the effects of employment practices on racial and
ethnic minority groupS.81
One of the methods they recommended for reducing adverse impact in a VG-GA TB referral system
appears to have been banned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The other method they recommended, the
Combined Rules Referral Plan, was not outlawed and appears to be a viable method of eliminating
adverse impact in ES referrals. Under this plan employers would receive three candidates Per opening
chosen by a ranking aJgorithm that takes no account of race or gender and up to three additional
referrals of minority applicants selected from the top of two pools of minority candidates. Employers
would receive both a within-group percentile and a total group expectancy score representing the
predicted "chance of being a better-than-average worker." They would factor that information into the
next stage of their selection process as they saw fit.
The Employment Service has been trying to facilitate the affIrmative action efforts of private
firms for decades. Within group scoring of VG-GATB was preceded by SATB decision rules which had
the same effect. Under the Combined Rules Referral Plan, the stance of the ES would be that it is
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trying to encourage employers to "cast a wider net" when they recruit for jobs. This type of affIrmative
action has seldom been controversial. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the executive order
requiring affIrmative action apply ftrst and foremost to ftrms.
The attraction of this approach is that it places responsibility for the composition of the
work force with the employer The Job Service is not placed in the position of
appearing to relieve the employer of these decisions, an implication that some employers
seem to have drawn from the VG-GATB system of referral based only on within-group
scores.52
VI. TRADEOFFS BE1WEEN MATCHING EFFICIENCY AND OPTIMAL INCENTIVES
,-'
How should a system for signalling skills and accomplishments to the labor market be
structured? Would a system built around GATB style tests have the kinds of incentive effects that are
sought by educational reformers? Before these questions can be seriously addressed, we must examine
more closely exactly what tests like the GATB measure. Once that bas been accomplished, the tradeoff's
between incentives to study and matching efficiency will be discussed.
6.1 What does the GATB Measure?
Even though the GATB is billed as an "aptitude" test, scores on many of its subtests are
products of the individual's educational experiences. In the view of testing professionals:
Achievement and aptitude tests are not fundamentally different Tests at one end of the
aptitude-achievement continuum can be distinguished from tests at the other end
primarily in terms of purpose. For example, a test for mechanical aptitude would be
included in a battery of tests for selecting among applicants for pilot training since
knowledge of mechanical principles has been found to be related to success in flying. A
similar test would be given at the end of a course in mechanics as an achievement test
intended to measure what was learned in the course General ability or "intelligence"
refers to a repertoire of information-processing skills and habits These skills and habits
must be developed.063
The professional consensus is that employment tests measure abilities, skills and habits which must be
developed and which are, therefore malleable. How malleable depends on the nature of the skill and the
power of the educational intervention. Evidence of the malleability of the skills measured by
employment tests can be found in a variety of literatures. Adoption studies have found that children
adopted by upper middle class parents have significantly higher IQ and academic achievement than the
siblings who remain with their lower class parents.84 Numerous studies have found that school
attendance raises scores on these aptitude tests, and that taking a rigorous college prep curriculum
increases the gains on these tests between sophomore and senior years of high school.85 The important
effects of environment on these developed abilities are also demonstrated by the upward trend of
national mean scores on IQ tests,66 by the large fluctuations in scores on broad spectrum achievement
tests (scores of Iowa seniors on the Iowa Test of Educational Development rose .58 standard deviations
between 1942 and 1%7 and then fell by .35 standard deviations between 1%7 and 1979),67 and by the
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reduction by nearly one-half in the gap between black and white achievement in reading and math during
the last two decades~
It is sometimes argued that even though schooling raises scores on aptitude tests, variation in
scores across individuals of the same age really measure a stable "ability to learn" which is not
substantially effected by educational experiences after the age of 10, and that it is this "ability to learn"
not the content of the courses taken in secondary and tertiary education which helps workers who score
well on these tests to get higher paying jobs and/or perform better in a given job. If this were true, we
would expect childhood IQ tests to predict adult labor murlcet success just as well as general academic
ability tests taken as a young adult. In fact, however, when years of schooling and the two test scores are
entered into an earnings regression, it is the adult test not the childhood test which has by far the biggest
effect on labor market success in both US and Swedish data.88
These findings suggest that the associations between scores on employment aptitude and IQ
tests, on the one hand, and job performance and labor market success on the other arise because the
tests measure developed abilities and knowledge that contribute to productivity. This suggests that an
increase in the incidence of these developed abilities in the working population will increase national
output.
Widespread use of tests like the GATB to refer and select workers for jobs is likely to
strengthen incentives to develop the skills assessed by the test battery. Would greater use of 'aptitude' ,
tests like the GATB result in the kind of signaUing system desired by educational reformers?
6.2 Tradeoff's between Incentive and Matching Efficiency Goals
Student incentives to learn, teacher incentives to set high standards, and parental incentives to
demand a quality education will be strongest when:
(1) silmificant economic rewards depend directly and visibly on academic accomplishments,
(2) accomplishments are defined relative to an extemalIy imposed standard of achievement and not
relative to one's classmates. [This is essential because assessing performance relative to fellow
students through grades and class rank not relative to an external standard results in classmates
having a personal interest in persuading each other not to study. No adolescent wants to be
considered a 'nerd,' 'brain geek,' 'grade grubber' or as 'acting white,' yet that is what now
happens to students who study hard and are seen to study hard.]
the reward is received very soon after the learning occurs,
everyone, including those who begin high school with serious academic deficiencies, has an
achievable 20al which will generate significant rewards,
(5) there is a good deal of overlap between the indicators used by employers for selection and the
indicators used by colleges for admission decisions, [This is desirable because most students
aspire to college and the programmatic needs of these students get first priority in most schools.
In the United States, a system of examinations and exhibitions in which college bound students
do not participate would inevitably become stigmatized.]
(3)
(4)
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(6) the assessment system generating the indicators evaluates all of the types of learning the society
feels is important, [Since it is anticipated that students will attempt to prepare for the
assessments and that teaching will be influenced by them, it is essential that the assessments be
"authentic"--ie. measure the capabilities that society wants its young people to develop. Some of
these capabilities may have little value in the labor market.
Specific components of the assessment are prepared for in specific courses or subjects. It is
important that teachers feel individually responsible for how their students do on th~ assessment
and that responsibility not be diffused over the entire faculty of the school
progress toward the goal can be monitored by the student, parents and teacher.
(7)
(8)
.,~g
Matching efficiency, on the other hand, is maximized when the indicators used in selection for
particular occupations measure developed abilities which have a uniquely high productivity payoff in that
occupation (eg. mechanical comprehension for maintenance and repair occupation). In other words,
selection/classification protocols should attempt to encourage workers to enter occupations in which they
have a comparative advantage. Job relatedness is also essential if the system is to be consistent with the
requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Tests should be used but they should supplement not
displace consideration of other factors such as personality, physical strength and occupationally relevant
training and work experience which are also important determinants of job performance and retention.
It is not easy to design a system of signalling and certifying academic achievement which satisfies
all of these requirements. Consequently, it will generally be desirable to use more than one signal of
academic achievement and to use different signals and weight them differentially when selecting for
different jobs. Let us examine the pros and cons of a few of the primary alternatives and then make
some practical recommendations for an ES referral system:
. Diplomas
. Grades in High School
. Job Tryout, Dismissals and Promotions Based on Performance
. Work samples and Job KnowledgeTests
. Employment Aptitude Tests--eg. GATB
. Broad Spectrum Achievement Tests
. School Sponsored Achievement Exams
DiDlomas:
High school diplomas and college degrees are effective devices for generating incentives to enroll
in school. The standard high school diploma does not, however, generate incentives to attend regularly
or to study hard and thus it fails requirement # 1, the most critical requirement of all. Establishing a
minimum competency level for receiving a high school diploma improves incentives but only modestly.
Some students arrive in high school so far behind and the consequences of not getting a diploma are so
severe, minimum competency standards are typically not set very high. If the diploma were the only
signal of academic accomplishment available, there would be a danger that many students would stop
putting effort into their academic courses once the minimum had been satisfied.
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Schooling is a valid predictor of job performance but to a great degree its validity derives from
its correlation with measured verbal, mathematical and technical competence. The evidence on its
incremental contribution to predicting job performance in specific jobs once these competencies are
controlled is more mixed. The analysis of GATB revalidation data presented above found the effect of
schooling to be very weak but this is probably an artifact of selection bias. Analysis of military data finds
that high school graduation has its own unique impacts when test scores are controlled. Weiss's (1985)
study of Western Electric employees found that completing high school is a valid predictor of low
absenteeism and low turnover but not job performance. Even when studies find that graduating from
high school has little effect on job performance, it appears to effect retention. Consequently, from a
matching efficiency point of view, the high school diploma belongs on the list of credentials considered by
employers even when good assessments of verbal, mathematical and technical competencies are available.
Yean of schooling and diplomas [even diplomas that reflect a high standard of achievement]
should never be the sole indicator of educational auomplishment signalled to colleges and the labor marlcet.
They should, however, be one of the many signals of educational accomplishment included in a new
signalling system. maen seeking referrals from such a system, employers should be encouraged to specify
their preferences in tenns of educational credentials, particularly credentials reflecting occupationally specific
training. Educational credentials should also be a part of the ranking algorithm used to make job referrals.
H~ Based on Grades in Hi2h School:
Using grades to select new hires results in a very visible dependence of labor market outcomes
on an indicator of academic accomplishment. There are, however, two disadvantages. It results in zero-
sum competition between classmates and consequently contn"butes to peer pressure against studying and
parental apathy about the quality of teaching and the rigor of the curriculum. The second problem is
that it induces students to select easy courses and pressures teachers to become easy graders. These
problems can be mitigated somewhat if employers take the rigor of courses into account when evaluating
grades, give preference to schools with tough grading standards, and vary the number hired from
particular schools in response to the actual job performance of past hires from that school.
From the matching point of view, the disadvantage of high school GPA is that it has low Viilidity
when there are no adjustments made for grading standards and it is difficult for employers to make such
adjustments.70 Nevertheless, the signalling/referral system should obtain data on GPA's, grades in
particular subjects and exJracurrlcularactivities and incorporate this infonnation in its job perfonnance
prediction algorithms.
Job Trvout and Promotions Based on Performance:
From the point of view of motivating students to study, the problem with job tryout and
performance reward systems is that the dependence of labor market outcomes on academic achievements
is both invisible and considerably delayed.
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From the efficiency point of view, the disadvantages of job tryout are the costs of training
workers who end up being fired, its unpopularity with workers who will spend months unemployed if they
are fired, and its potential for generating grievances. Performance evaluations are known to be
unreliable, and this makes workers reluctant to take jobs in which next year's pay is highly contingent on
one supervisor's opinion?1 Pay that is highly contingent on performance can also weaken cooperation
and generate incentives to sabotage others and to act strategically when pay is being negotiated!2 The
benefits of performance reward systems are that they motivate better performance, they tend to attract
high performers to the fIrm, and they tend to induce the high performers to stay at the fIrm. When
these factors are balanced, it appears that most workers and employers choose compensation schemes in
which differentials in relative productivity result in relatively small wage differentials?3 'While all new
hires are to some degree on probation during the first months on a job, it would be quite inefficient for finns
to use job tryouts as their primary mode of selecting new hires.
:¥
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Work Samples and Job Knowledge Tests:
From the point of view of matching efficiency, job performance assessments and job knowledge
tests have much to recommend them for they maximize classification efficiency-the assignment of job
seekers to jobs which make use of already acquired skills. Meta analyses have found that content valid
job knowledge tests are considerably more valid predictors of supervisory ratings than general ability
testS?4 They are clearly job related so they seldom are challenged on EEO grounds. They are
particularly appropriate if applicants vary in their knowledge and background in the occupation and
training costs are substantial. Job knowledge tests are less useful when none of the applicants has
experience in the field, when training costs are low and when promotions to very different jobs are
common.
From the point of view of learning incentives, the disadvantage of assessing job performance and
job knowledge is that it generates no incentives to study history and literature and generate incentives to
study math and science only occasionally (i.e. when the student expects to seek a technical job and the
job ~owledge tests for the job contains math and science questions relevant to the job). If job
knowledge tests were the only selection criteria of most employers, students might be induced to over-
specialize. If jobs in the field for which they prepared are not available, they might be left high and dry.
This is not a real danger, however, because indicators of competence in mathematics and communication
can easily be used in conjunction with job knowledge tests.
General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB)-as constituted in 1990:
The cognitive subtests of the current GATB measure only a limited number of very basic skills--
vocabulary, reading, arithmetic computation and reasoning. There are no sub-tests measuring
achievement in most of the subjects studied in high school--science, history, economics, business practice,
algebra and geometry. Greater use of the GATB to make hiring selections might strengthen incentives
to learn arithmetic and English somewhat but, since it is perceived as an aptitude test, it's impact on
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perceptions of the benefits of studying would probably be small. Consequently, hiring on the basis of the
GA TB fails requirement # 1 and # 6.
Individuals who take alternative forms of the GATB a few days or weeks apart greatly improve
their scores the second time they take the test.75 H the GATB becomes a popular screening test,
security of the test items would become a problem and commercial coaching schools would be sure to
emerge. Indeed, when the GA TB was the primary selection tool for entry into prized apprenticeship
programs, "GATB prep" programs were often offered by unions trying to increase minority
representation in their apprenticeships.
On the other hand, we have seen that there is a large body of research suggesting that the
cognitive subtests of the GATB are valid predictors of job performance in many jobs and significant
gains in matching efficiency would result from greater use of aptitude tests like the GA TB. But we will
show shortly that other selection methods--broad spectrum achievement test batteries-are able to achieve
at least as efficient matching outcomes as the GATB and generate much better incentive effects.
Broad Soectrum Achievement Tests Batteries:
From the point of view of incentives to study a broad range of academic subjects, broad
spectrum achievement test batteries such as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASV AB)
are the best of the alternatives reviewed so far. H some of the subtests in the battery included material
covered in courses such as algebra, statistics, chemistry, physics and computers, the use of such tests for
selection would generate parental pressure for an upgraded curriculum and encourage all high school
students to take more rigorous courses. When many employers use achievement tests to select new
employees, everyone who wants a good job faces a strong incentive to study, and those not planning to
go to college will find the incentive especially strong. The best paying firms will find they can set higher
test score cutoffs than low paying firms, so the reward fer learning will become continuous. Whether
one begins 9th grade way behind or way ahead, there will be a benefit on the margin to studying hard for
it will improve one's job prospects.
Assessments of a broad spectrum of foundation skills and competencies covering science,
computers, mechanical principles, economics, business practices and technology as well as mathematics,
reading and vocabulary also generates larger matching benefits. Assessment batteries which cover the
full spectrum of knowledge and skills taught in high school are more valid predictors of job performance
than tests which assess math and verbal skills only. Evidence for this statement comes from examining
the relative contributions of various subtests to the total validity of the ASV AB battery.78 Tests
measuring electronics, mechanical, automotive and shop knowiedge--maferiaJ that is generally studied
only in vocational courses--have high validity. Analyzing this and other military data sets, Hunter,
Crosson and Friedman concluded that the "general cognitive ability" construct that best predicted
performance in all military jobs included subtests in general science, electronics information, mechanical
comprehension and mathematics knowledge as well as conventional word knowledge and arithmetic
reasoning subtests. The addition of these four subtests to the construct increased validity by 11 percent
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and the proportion of true job performance variance explained in the Maier and Grafton data from .306
to 372.77
Broad spectrum achievement test batteries also improve classification efficiency. The technical
subtests of ASVAB are important predictors of hands-on measures of job performance in technical and
maintenance jobs but did not contribute to the prediction of performance in clerical jobs. Verbal
subtests contributed to clerical performance but did not correlate with performance in many of the other
jobs in the study. Assessments of knowledge and understanding of computers, business, economics,
marketing and psychology would probably similarly improve the validity of batteries usp.d to select
workers for most white collar jobs in the private sector. The conclusion that follows from this ana1ysis is
that, on both matching and incentive grounds, assessments of broad spectTUmSof competencies are better
devices for selecting workers than tests which focus solely on verbal, arithmetic, perceptual and psychomotor
skills.
This implies that the Employment Service should replace the GATB (which has not changed
appreciably since 1950) with something which assesses the full range of competencies that effect job
perfonnance. Subtests similar to the technical, mathematical knowledge and science subtests of the ASV AB
or the NAEP should be added and the ranking algorithm revised to reflect militaly researck The
employment service should also undertake a major study of the validity of the new GA TB in the full
spectfUm of civilian jobs and undertake to develop subtests assessing knowledge of business, marketing and
computers.
Performance on Achievement Exams Taken toward the End of Secondarv School
In Europe and Japan, the educational system administers examinations which are closely tied to
the ~urriculum. While the Japanese use a multiple choice exam, all other nations use extended answer
examinations in which students write essays, show their work for mathematics problems and actually
make something in applied technologies metal machining. In most countries, regional or national boards
set the exam and oversee the blind grading of the exams by committees of teachers. The grades on these
exams signal academic achievement to all employers; not just the employers who choose to ask the ES
for VG-GATB referrals or give employment tests on their own. The connection between the teacher's
competence, the student's study effort and performance on these exams is visible to all. Consequently,
school sponsored achievement exams like those used in Europe would have much stronger incentive
effects for students and teachers than employer or ES administered broad spectrum achievement tests.
This approach to signaling academic achievement has a number of advantages. Because it is
centralized and students take the exam at most only a few times, job applicants do not have to take a
different exam at each firm they contact. School sponsored assessments are, consequently, more
comprehensive and higher in quality. More time is available for administering and grading the exam, so
it becomes feasible to use "authentic. forms of assessment which are considerably more costly to
implement. There is no need for multiple versions of the same test and it is much easier to keep the test
secure. By retaining control of exam content, educators and the public influence the kinds of academic
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achievement that are rewarded by the labor market. Societal decisions regarding the curriculum (eg. all
students should read Shakespeare's plays and understand the Constitution) tend to be reinforced by
employer hiring decisions. Tests developed solely for employee selection purposes would probably place
less emphasis on Shakespeare and the Constitution.
The disadvantages of European style school administered achievement exams is that students are
typically given only one or two chances to demonstrate their competence in specific subjects. With
employer administered exams, having an off day is less damaging for one will shortly have a chance to do
better at another employer. Employers may also find it is easier to compare job applicants who have all
taken the same employer administered exam. The primary danger, however, is that the examination
system will be designed solely around the needs of post-secondary education and that work place
competencies and applied technology will be slighted. H so, students might be induced to devote time to
academic subjects like Shakespeare that might be better spent learning about metal working or
computers. This appears to be a problem in Great Britain and many developing nations. The job
relatedness requirement of the Civil Rights Act will tend to discourage this from happening in the United
States.
For young workers, a system like the new French Baccalaureate (which offer Bac exams in a
host applied technology fields as well the standard academic subjects) would probably be just as valid as
a broad spectrum tests like the ASVAB. Students can choose which exams to prepare for and scores for
each subject are reported so employers may focus on the exams which have special relevance to their
jobs. School administered tests are more reliable measures of achievement because they sample a much
larger portion of the student's knowledge of the field (the ASVAB General Science subtest, by contrast,
allows the student 11 minutes to do 24 items). They may also be more valid because they are not limited
to the multiple choice format. Thus, even though the topics covered will probably be less relevant to the
firm's jobs, a correctly weighted average of exam results is probably just as valid a predictor of
performance for young workers as a specially designed employment test.
H such a system were to be created in the U.S., the ES would need to incorporate the results of
these school assessments into its matching algorithm. Research on how this might be done need not wait
until a national exam system is created. New York State's Regents examination system is similar to the
Bac in many respects, and much could be learned by studying the ability of Regents test scores to predict
wage rates and job performance. Does, for example, the impact of school exam results on wages and
performance decline with age?
6.3 Is Top Down Referral Optimal?
What should office wide implementation of an expanded computerized VG-GA TB system look like?
With only a few ~eptions, all ES registrants should complete questionnaires on general and occupation
skills and experience. This infonnation would be entered into a computer either directly by the applicant or
through an optical scanning instrument. The applicant would also specify the types of jobs he/she would
like to be refe"ed to and provide (01' a confidential basis) his/her minimum acceptable wage. Individuals
wanting to compete on the basis of an occupational competency test would take the appropriate test and
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refen-als would be based on some combination of biodata and test results. Applicants would also be
encouraged (but not required) to take the expanded VG-GATB battery and referrals would be based on
some combination of work experience infonnation from the questionnaire and GA TB subtest scores.
Individuals who choose neither of the test based options would be referred on the basis of biographical data
alone.
.'{~
Employers seeking refemlis would specify which of the three types of matching they prefer.
Employers requesting screening on the basis of occupational competency tests would have first crack at the
pool of applicants. Employers desiring screening on the basis of occupationally specific skills, training and
experience (either solely or in combination with GA TB test scores) would have second CTtlCk. Employers
not seeking occupation specific skills would have third crack at the pool. Within these categories, /inns
offering the higher compensatio'! during the first few years on the job would be seMced first.
The purpose of this system of priorities is to try to insure that workers who are highly skilled in a
particulor occupation are able to stIly in that occupation and are not refemd to jobs which do not make use
of these skills. It is also intended to result in the higher wage /inns being able to attract the more qruzlified
workers. It is not likely to be completely successful, however. Since the stock of applicants will be much
larger than the flow of job orders, the system wiU have a tendency to allocate opportunities to search the
applicant pool on a first~ome-first-serve basis. Low wage employers would have referred to them the most
qualified applicants in the system at the time they enter their job order. It is not clear that this is the
optimal matching/referral algorithm. It will generally be desirable for applicants who are highly qruzlified in
a particular field to limit their search for a while to jobs which make full USE of their skills and then
broaden the search to lower paying jobs which make ,lesser use of their skills only when the first effort is
clearly not yielding fruit. This could be accomplished by encouraging applicants to specify a minimum
acceptable wage which declines as time passes.
Before an individual is referred, the ES should have good reason to believe that the applicant will
.
probably accept the job if offered and stay with the job. Consequently, the turnover of ES refemlis needs to
be studied and tumover predictions incorporated somehow into the matching algorithm. Another critical
area for research is simulation studies of the consequences of different matching/referral algorithms. While
the high-skill-high-wage finns in a community should clearly receive top-down referral service from the ES, it
is not self evident that low-skill-high-tumover finns should have essentially equal priority to top-down
refemlis based on GA TB test scores (constrained only by job seeker reservation wages and occupation
preferences).
The NRC report expressed a fear that the VG-GATB system might create a pennanent class of
unemployables. If all employers choose to receive top-down referrals, workers with high scores might be
hired, but those with low test scores would languish indefinitely in the pool of registrants not even receiving
refemlis to low skill low wage jobs. As additional job orders flow into the ES, the reservoir of high test
score individuals would probably become depleted. Employer disillusionment with the ES might retum,
shutting off the growth of job orders before a reasonable balance has been achieved between the flow of
applicants and the flow of job orders. The new equilibrium market share would be higher than it is now,
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but the ES would no 10llger be providing refen'al assistance to the low-skililow-test-score job seekers. These
individuals would have to make their own job contacts. Job club type assistance might be about all that the
ES could do for these individuals.
If the ES is to maximize its market share and to serve its multiple constituencies, a means of
forestalling this outcome is needed. The best way to deal with this problem is to charge employers who
receive refen'als on the basis of competency or GA TB tests a refen'al fee to cover the costs of the testing.
Non-test based refen'als and ''cast a wider net" refen-als would be free. The fee would be set high enough to
insure that at least a quarter of the job orders would not specify test based refen-al. The fee internalizes an
externality generated by the common property character of being able to make top-dcwn selections from the
ES's applicant pool. This fee system would leave the decision about whether to access the top-down referral
pool to the firm not to bureaucratic judgement or regulations.
"'
Matching Efficiency-lO/17 192 48
Appendix A
THE EOPP EMPWYER SURVEY
The EOPP data comes from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the National Institute on
Education (NIE) and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education (NCRVE) conducted
between February and June 1982. The survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of
employers from selected geographic areas across the country. The flI'st wave was funded by the U.S.
Department of Labor to collect data on area labor market effects of the Employment Opportunity Pilot
Projects (EOPP). The survey encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18 comparison sites selected for
their similarity to the pilot sites. The ES-202 lists of companies paying unemployment insurance taxes
provided the sample frame for the survey. Because of the interest in low wage labor markets, the sample
design specified that establishments in industries with a relatively high proportion of low-wage workers be
over sampled. The tax paying units were stratified by the estimated number of low wage employees and
the number of establishments selected from each strata was roughly in proportion to the estimated
number of low wage workers at the establishments in that strata. Within strata the selection was
random. The survey was conducted over the phone and obtained a response rate of 75 percent.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the first-wave survey. About
70 percent of the original respondents completed surveys for the second wave. Of the 3412 respondents,
2457 were single establishment firms and 930 were parts of corporations with multiple establishments.
Most of the respondents were the owner/manager of small establishments who were quite familiar with
the performance of each of the flI'ID'semployees. Seventy percent of the establishments had fewer than
50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200 employees. In large organizations the primary
respondent was the person in charge of hiring, generally the personnel officer. If the primary respondent
was unable to answer questions about the training received by newly hired workers in the sampled job,
that part of the interview was completed by talking to a supervisor or someone else with line
responsibility.
The employers who received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the last new employee
your company hired prior to August 1981 ree:ardless of whether that person is still employed by your
company." Only 2594 employers had hired someone in the time frame requested and these employers
constitute the sample used for estimating Equation 2 models.
The sample of jobs for which paired data were available for estimating Equation 3 models was
generated in the following manner. The employers that provided information on one new hire were
asked to provide data on a second new hire in the same job but with contrasting amounts of vocational
education. Of the 2,594 employers that provided data on 1 new hire, 1,511 had not hired anyone else in
that job in the last 2 years, and 424 had not hired anyone with a different amount of vocational training
for that position in the last 2 years. As a result, data are available for 659 pairs of individuals who have
the same job at the same establishment. Missing data on specific questions used in the model further
reduced the sample used for estimation to about 480.
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The respondent was asked to report how much time typical new hires for this job spent during
the first three months of employment in four different kinds of training activities: (1) watching others do
the job rather than doing it themselves, (2) formal training programs, (3) informal individualized training
and extra supervision by management and line supervisors, and (4) informal individualized training and
extra supervision by co-workers. For the sample of firms and jobs, the means for the typical worker
were 473 hours watching others do the job (Tw)' 10.7 hours for formal training programs (TF)' 51 hours
for informal training by management (Ts), 24.2 hours for informal training by co-workers (Tc)' A copy
of the relevant portions of the questionnaire is available from the author.
Training time indexes were constructed by placing relative values on trainer and trainee time and
then combining the time invested in training activities during the first three months on the job. The
management staff members who provide formal and informal training were assumed to be pend 1.5 times
the wage of coworkers with 2 years of tenure. Formal training involves both the trainer and trainee's
time. Sometimes it is one-on-one and sometimes it is done in groups. It was assumed that the average
ratio of trainees to trainers was 4 and that the value of the trainer's time (including the amortized cost of
developing the training package) was four times the wage of a coworker with two years of tenure. The
time of trainees engaged in formal training was assumed to have a value of 8/1Oths of a experienced
coworker's time. When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal training to a new employee, the
trainee is almost invariably directly involved in a production activity. Employers report that for informal
training, the trainees are typically as productive while being trained as they are when working alone
(Hollenbeck and Smith 1984). Consequently, informal training is assumed to involve only the investment
of the trainer's time.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate supervisor) to report on
productivity of both new hires during the first two weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the time of the
interview (or just before leaving for those who leave the fmn). The rating was made on a "scale of zero
to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees in (NAME'S) position
can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your employee." The fact that the non-response rate
for this question was only 4.4 percent (while it was 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 6.7
percent for education, and 5.7 percent for the questions about starting wage rate) suggests that
respondents felt capable of making such judgments and augurs well for the quality of the data that
results. For the sample of firms which provided data on two new hires the mean values of these indexes
of reported productivity were 49.2 for the fIrst two weeks, 64.7 for the next 11 weeks and 75.4 at the time
of the interview. A more thorough description of the EOPP-NCRVE data is provided in B
ishop 198_.
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Appendix B
Variable Definitions in the NFIB Data
Reference Checks: Data on whether a check had been made with a previous supervisor came
from: "Prior to hiring, hiring did you obtain a referral or recommendation (written or oral) from: [ mark
the appropriate sources] (a) Immediate supervisor on previous job(s) (b) Personnel office at previous
job(s) : The personnel office reference variable is 1 when (b) is selected and (a) is not; otherwise it is
zero. Information on past experience with the person giving an employment reference comes from the
following question: "Had you ever hired someone on this person's recommendation before? (1) Yes; (2)
No; (3) Some of both: Previously hired on this person's recommendation was set equal to 1 when either
aYes or a 'some of both' response was obtained.
Recruitment Source: The NFIB recruitment source variables were developed from the following
question: "How did this individual hear of your job opening? (1) Walk in; (2) Advertisement;
(3)Friend/Relative; (4) Other employee; (5) Referral. e.g. school, employment agency, etc.; (6) other:
Details on who made the referral came from "Prior to hiring, hiring did you obtain a referral or
recommendation (written or oral) from: [ check list]: The Vocational Teacher category is more exactly
"High school vocational teacher or major professor in college: The Other Teacher category is more
exactly "Other teachers, principal, school placement office, etc: The public agency category included
"public employment agency", "JTPA or community based organization" and "vocational rehabilitation
agency: The number of cases was insufficient to draw distinction between these three categories of
public agencies. The excluded category of the set of dummy variables was the new hires who had heard
of the job through "Friend/relative", "Other employee" and "other:
Training Cost: The constraints of a mail questionnaire forced a simplification of questions about
time devoted to training. Whereas the EOPP questionnaire distinguished formal from informal, and
informal training from supervisors from informal training by coworkers, all three of these forms of
training were combined in one very short question: "How many hours did you or an employee spend
training or closely supervising A or B?" Two other types of training investment were distinguished. The
questions were: "How many additional hours (beyond training and close supervision) did A/B spend
learning the job by watching others rather than doing it?" and "How many hours did A/B spend reading
manuals, etc. in order to learn the job?" Owners were asked to complete this question for the "first
week" of employment and for the "next six months.0i78 The training differential analyzed below is the
logarithm of the ratio of the total number of hours spent in the three forms of training over the six
month period.
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Appendix C
Tbe Construction of the Profitability Measures
The Productivity Indexes: Validity of the Ratio Scale Assumption
The questions asked in these two surveys about the productivity of particular individuals do not
yield measures of productivity that are comparable across ftrms or across jobs within the firm. They are
assumed, however, to be ratio scale measures of the relative productivity of two particular workers who
have the same job. Measurement errors are assumed to be uncorrelated with the true ratio scale. Since
the productivity indexes are used as dependent variables not independent variables, measurement error
only lowers the significance of hypothesis tests, it does not result in biased coefficients. If these
assumptions are wrong and the variations in the productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate
the proportionate variations in true productivity, our estimates of percentage differences in productivity
between two workers will be biased upward. Even though it is possible for a worker's true productivity
to be negative, the scale was deftned as having a lower limit of zero. F100rs and ceilings on a scale
typically cause measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true value. Furthermore,
respondents who were not well informed about the relative productivity of their employees would
probably tend to describe them as similar in productivity and not to exaggerate the differences between
them.
.If this is the case, then our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two
workers will be biased downward. This latter type of bias appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the ratio scale assumption results in an understatement of percentage
differences in productivity between individual workers doing the same job comes from comparing the
coefficients of variation of productivity in this and other data sets. If pairs of workers who are still at the
firm are used to construct a coefficient of variation in the EOPP-NCRVE data set, it averages .13 for
sales clerks, clerical, service and blue collar workers. This estimate of the coefficient of variation is
smaller than the estimates of the coefficient of variation for yearly output derived from analysis of
objective ratio scale measures of output. These estimates were .35 in sales clerk jobs, .144 in semi-skilled
blue collar jobs, .28 in craft jobs, .164 in routine clerical jobs and .278 in clerical jobs with decision
making responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and ludiesch 1988). This means that the estimates of the effect
of background characteristics on relative productivity growth reported in this paper are probably
conservative. The fact that the employer is reporting on the past productivity of particular employees
may also generate biases in data, but it is not clear how the estimated models might be influenced by this
problem.
Measures of the Profitability Differentials for New Hires
Estimates of differentials in the ex-post profttability of the two new hires by combining the data
on their wage, productivity and training costs differentials. Because data is not available on costs of
training beyond the ftrst three months at the ftrm, the ex-post profttability variable for the date of the
interview or separation is based solely on a comparison of the productivity and wage rate differentials
between the two new hires. In EOPP data the formula for profttability differential at the time of the
interview was:
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YC'j-YC2j = [(p:,j-P:2j)/pTj] -lnCW:,j;W:2j) (Ia)
The formula for the differential in ex-post profitability during the first three months. is:
YS'(YS2j = [(pS,(pS2j)/pTd - (~'(~2j)/520] - [(W3,(WS2j)fWj] (2a)
where
YSq' YCq = Profitability (excluding any tax credits) of the "i"th new hire in job "j" during the first
three months (S), during the first week (IW), at the end of six months (6M)
and at the time of the interview or separation (C).
pSI)' IPq = Productivity index for person "i"during the first 3 months (S), during the first week
(IW), at the end of six months (6M) and at the time of the interview or
separation (C).
WSq,VorIJ= Wage of person "i" at the start (S) and at the time of the interview or separation
(C).
p2Y1'WZ"j = Productivity index and wage of the typical worker in job "j" with two years of
tenure (2Y).
~q = Opportunity costs during the first three months of training person Wi".The units of the
training index are hours of time of a worker with two years of tenure in job "j".
Note that by dividing by p2Y1'the productivity differential, (~,(~ 21)'is translated into the metric of the
productivity expected from a worker with two years of tenure in job OJ".This is also the metric of the
training cost differential so the two terms may be summed. .The starting wage differential, (WS,(~ 21)' is
divided by the wage of a typical worker with two years of tenure in the job. The profitability proxy is
constructed under an assumption that p2Yj= WZ"j' This implies that the third term need not be
multiplied by an adjustment factor before being subtracted from the terms describing productivity and
training differentials.
In NFIB data the formulas for ex-post profitability differentials for the first week (1W), the next
six months (6M) and at the interview were:
yW,(yw2j = [(P,w,(p,w2j)/~J] - [(T'w,(Tw2j)/40] -[WS'J~2j] + 1 (3a)
yI'M,(yl'M2I= [(~'I-~2j)~I] - (~'(~2j)/960] - [WS'lfWS2j]+ 1 (4a)
YC,( yc 21 = [In(P:,lP: 21)]-[(T"'A,(~ 21)/960]- [In(v.P,l~ 21)] (5a)
where:
T'W. = Hours spent by person "i" in training during the first week.
~II = Hours spent by person Wi"in training during the next 6 months.
These NFIB formulas assume that ~J = WS1 = ~I' Because workers with formal off job training from
a previous employer are not paid more than other workers, other assumptions regarding the relationship
between psM)'WSJand Vorl(such as ~I = 1.4~j) willnot changethe statisticalsignificanceofthe tests
of the hypothesis that coefficient B in equation (1) is greater than zero. The tests of the profitability of
hiring workers with relevant experience are, however, sensitive to these assumptions.
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following decision rules were adopted. Responses of "Continuous," "DK" and "?" were
coded as missing. If the employer had entered a "0"or "none" for one category of
training and left others categories blank, blanks were coded as missing. If the
employer had not answered the question about productivity at the end of six months,
all training questions about the six months period following the first week were coded
as missing. Otherwise, a blank was coded as zero. This procedure probably errs on
the side of retaining observations that should have been dropped and this lowers
calculated means for the sample. The resulting means for the first week on the job
were 18.4 hours for trainer time, 5.7 hours for watching others and 3.5 hours for
reading manuals. For the next six months the means were 54.6 hours for trainer time,
20.9 hours for watching others and 12.0 hours for reading manuals.
Matching Efficiency-lO/17/92 65
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF JOB TENURE
Under Under Over Over
One Yr TwoYrs SYrs 10 Yrs
United States (1951) 29.0% 38.1% 35.6% 19.8%
(1963) 24.5 33.2 46.1 34.5
(1966) 15.9 25.4 43.0 28.9
(1968) 16.9 28.2 43.8 28.7
(1978) 18.2 29.9 39.9 23.2
(1981) 27.7 39.3 39.5 23.6
United States (1983) 27:3 38.5 39.6 27.2
(1987) 28.8 40.1 40.5 26.7
Australia (1981) 25.0 38.8 37.2 19.4
Belgium (1972) 24.8 51.1 31.4
Canada (1983) 'l2.7 33.1 453 26.6
France (1978) 17.8 62.5 35.1
(1984) 57.5 36.0
Germany (1972) 25.0 51.0 34.5
(1985) 18.6 63.0 42.1
Italy (1972) 20.0 49.7 28.0
Japan (1982) 9.8 21.2 66.8 48.0
Luxembourg (1972) 22.6 58.1 41.6
Netherlands (1972) 25.2 503 32.1
United Kingdom (1979) 13.8 24.4 52.4 30.5
(1984) 51.8 29.8
Source: OECD 1984, Table 32; Buchtemann and Standing forthcoming; Hamel 1963, 1967; Hayghe 1974;
Horvath 1982; O'Boyle 1968; Sekscenski 1979; BLS Jan 1987)
Table 2
The Ability of WorkerCharacteristics to Predict
The Surprise in Productivity Realizations and Tenure
SurDrise in Productivity Expected lOQarittm of Actual Tenure
Firm Productivity Firm
Person Person Fixed Fixed Person Person Fixed
Worker A B Effect Effect A B Effect
Characteristics
Years of -.004 .0004 .011 .004 .002 .011 .004
Schoo ling (. 006) ( .0067) (. 008) (. 004) (. all) (. 015) ( . 019)
Years of Classroom .002 -.002 .012 .006 .0012 .011 .017
Occupationa 1 Training (. 007) (.008) (.010) (. 005) (.013) (. 015) (.023)
Oid Not Complete - .152** -.119 -.110
High School (.066) (.O97) (.loo)
Years of Relevant .0079* -.0008 .013** .0110*** -.016** .001 -.006
Work Experience (.OO47) (.0055) (.005) (.0026) (. 008) (.Oll) (.012)
Years of Re1. Work -.0001 .0001 -.0002 -.00024** .0006* .0002 .0004
Experience Squared (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) ( .0007) (. 0003) (.OOO4) (.OOO4)
Fonnal On-Jab-Training -.029 -.010 -.049* .041*** .017 -.063 -.005
(.020) (.024) (.026) (.013) (.O33) (.0(9) (.O6O)
Fonna1 Off-Jab-Training -.006 .001 .027 .025 .110* -.136 .014
(.037) (.(44) (.O54) (.026) (.O6O) (.O89) (.120)
Age - 18
- .0050* .0025 -.007* .0003 -.0017 .0024 .008(.0029) (.0039) (.OO4) (.0018) (.0049) (.0077) (.OO8)
(Age-18) squared .0001 -.0001 .0001
- .0000 .0001 - .0000 -.0001(.OOOl) (.OOOI) (.OOOI) (.OOOO) (.OOO1) (.OOO2) (.0002)
Female .040 -.026 -.003 -.007 .024 -.030 -.037
(.026) (.031) (.O37) (.018) (.0(5) (.063) (.O82)
Black -.039 -.035 -.029 -.038 -.133* -.016 .056( .0(9) (. 057) (. 050) ( .025) (.081) (.113) (.111)
Hispanic
-.020 .012 .010 -.041 -.171** .132 .089(.0(7) (.056) (.054) (.027) (.082) (.123) (.128)
Married -.005 .060* .045* .010 .042 .001 .088
(.028) (.035) (.027) (.013) (.049) (.072) (.061)
Husband .027
-.095** -.049 -.008 .017 .035 -.147*
(.036) (.O43) (. 035) (.017) (. 060) (.089) (.078)
TBIIIpOrary Job .055 .060** -.009 -.005 -.097**
- .138** -.237***(.025) (.029) ( . 035) (.017) (.041) (.059) (.076)
log TiE Since Hire
.992*** .966*** .964***
(.022) (. 027) (.035)
(log TiE Since Hire)Squared
.017 .014 .008
(.Oll) (.010) (.015)
Adjusted R Square .0022 -.0021 .0075 .0845 .6545 .5724 .4478
F Test on Inclusion of 1.16 .87 1.45 7.02*** 1. 87** .97 1.02
13-14 WkrBackground Vars
Root Mean SqError .280 .305 .324 .167 .506 .678 .800
Number of Observations 1021 842 833 914 1194 990 985
*
Prob. LT .10 on a two tail test
** Prob. LT .05 on a two tail test
*** Prob. LT .01 on a two tail test
66
Table 3 67
Predictors of the Surprise in Productivity Realizations,
Profitability of the Match and Turnover
Surprise in Profitability of the Match Productivity Nl8IIber Voluntary I..og3rittm
Reference Checks Productivity 1.!ill.i!! 6 Months Interview Interview of Ideas Overt ime of Tenure
Obtained Recommendation
.046* .039 .036 .040 .064* .366*** .158* -.004
Fran Previous Supervisor (.028) (.044) (.039 (.052) (.034) (.092) (.082) (.062)
Previously Hired on This .035 -.013 .080** .077 .034 .070 -.073 .077
Persons Recommendation (.028) (.043) (.038) (.051) (.034) (.091) (.080) (.062)
Recommendedby Personnel
-.105* -.001 -.194** -.170 -.126*
- .289 -.222 -.206
Office at Previous Job (.057) (.095) (
. 081) (.107) (.068) (.185) (.165) (.126)
Recruitment Source
Walk In
-.029 .010 -.004 -.006 -.007 -.054
- .056 -.088(.026) (.039) (.035) (.048) (.031) (.0854) (.076) (.058)
Newspaper Ad
-.013 -.082** -.028 .013 -.004 -.217** -.098 -.029(.027) (.042) (.036) (.051) ( .033) (.090) (.078) (.062)
Referral by:
Pub1ic Agency -.020 -.151* -.155** -.039 .024 -.109
-.315* -.044( .054) (.083) (.071) ( .099) (.065) (.178) (.163) (.120)
Priv. EqJl. Agency -.058 .070 .008 .047 -.063 -.080 .011 .211( .067) (.101) (.088) (. 119) (.086) (.224) (.189) (.146)
Vocat iona 1 Teacher -.033 -.022 -.016 .159** .042 -.122 -.012 -.082(.043) (.070) (.061) '(.081) (.055) (.157) (.134) (.108)
Other Teacher -.040 -.039 -.027 -.067 -.034 .283 .116
-.117(.052) (.084) (.071) (.095) (.068) (.188) (.160) (.127)
Other Referral -.063 -.026 -.041 -.012 -.041 -.171 -.201 -.006(.044) (.069) (.061) ( .087) (.054) (.147) (.129) (.099)
Backqround Characteristics
Years of .012 -.015 -.006 .003 .031*** .086*** -.003 .010
Schoo ling (.008) (.012) (.011) (.014) (.010) (.026) (.022) (.017)
Years of Relevant .009 .017 -.0003 -.006 -.008 .070* .071** .033
Classr0a8 Occup. Training (.011) (.017) ( .015) (.019) (.013) (.036) (.032) (.024)
Relevant Private .063* .002 .041 -.021 .075* -.015 .108
-.123
Occupational Training (.038) (.059) (.053) (.073) (.044) (.122) (.108) (.083)
Relevant JTPA Occupational .062 -.114 .157 .038 .128 -.027 .172 .194
Training (.087) (.146) (.120) (.170) (.105) (.287) ( .250) (.200)
Years of Relevant .012** .031*** .009 -.011 .015** .063*** .029* -.002
Work Experience (.005) (.008) (.008) (.012) (.006) (.017) (.015) (
. 012)
Years of Re1. Work -.0002 -.0008**
- .0003 .0001 -.0002 -.0019*** -.0004 .0001
Experience Squared (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0005) (.0002) (.0006) (.0006) (.0004)
Rel. E8ployer Sponsored
- .059** .077* -.049 .015 .004 .088 -.042 -.013
Fo1"llitl On-Job-Training (.027) (.042) (.036) (.050) (.032) (.089) (.078) (.061)
Re1. E8ployer Sponsored .017 .035 .099 .155 .098 .358** .062 .037
Fo1"llitl Off-Job-Training (.053) (.083) (.073) (.096) (.065) ( .178) (.158) (.121)
Age - 18
-.0067* -.0124** -.0168*** -.0087 -.0025 -.0016 .011 .009
(.0037) (.0053) (.0049) ( .0067) (.0043) (.0114) (.010) (.008)
(Age-18) squared .0001 .0003* .0003*** .0001 -.0001 .0001 -.0004 -.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0003) (.0003) (.0002)
Fellale .003 .086 .059 .063 -.034 -.095 -.117 -.048
(.037) (.056) (.053) (.063) (.045) (.123) (.108) (.083)
Black -.020 .040 -.024 -.040 -.063 -.088 .080 .048
(.051) (.078) (.067) (.084) (.060) (.166) (.152) (.110)
Hispanic .018 .056 .018 .050 -.062 -.166 .040 .081
(.055) (.085) (.076) (.105) ( .072) (.190) (.164) (.128)
Married .044 -.043 .060 .120** .054 .203** .112 .073
(.027) (.042) (.037) (.051) (.033) (.092) (.080) (.061)
Husband -.049 -.044
- .162*** -.151** -.083* -.199* -.100 -.118(.035) (.054) (.047) (.066) (.043) (.117) (.102) ( .078)
T~rary Job -.004 .078 .036 .076 .043 -.102 .157
-.233***(.035) (.053) (.048) (.064) (.041) (.112) (.100) (.076)
Potential/Actual Tenure .035 .036 .102** .202*** .570*** .959***
(.033) (.029) (.041) (.025) (.067) (.035)
Potential/Actual Tenure Sq -.0001 -.0024 -.0132** -.0216***
- .058*** .003(.0041) (.0036) (.0053) (.0034) (.009) (.015)
Adjusted R Square .0137 .0415 .0593 .0427 .1208 .1594 .0191 .4478
f for Reference Check Vars 3.01** .32 3.92*** 1.99 3.26** 7.56*** 2.73** 1.45
I="-fnt'"DAr""";+ c:,."...............u...--
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Outcome
Productivity
First 2 llfeeks
Walk
In
-.02( .4)
Next 3-12 llfeeks -.02( .6)
At Interview
or Seperation
Other Outcomes
Training Cost
log Start ing
Wage
log Current
Wage
log Tenure
Involuntary
Turnover(O-l)
Quit(D-1)
Profitability
First3 nmths
At Interview
or Separation
At Interview
(for Stayers)
.00
( .1)
.02( .3)
.01( .5)
.01( .5)
-.07(1.0)
.074*
(1.8)
.007( .1)
-.03( .4)
-.01( .3)
.02( .3)
Table 4
Iq>act of Recruitment Source on Success of the Match
EOPP Data estimates of Equation 3
Newspaper
Ad
-.09*(1.7)
-.06(1.5)
-.09*
(2.0
.03( .3)
-.01( .3)
-.04(1.3)
-.24***
(2.8)
Publie
~loy.
Agency
-.12*(1.8)
-.08*(1.7)
-.12**
(2.2)
.06( .7)
.00( .0)
-.04( .9)
-.32***
(3.0)
.130*** .260***
(2.2) (3.4)
.045( .6)
-.10(1.1)
-.05(1.0)
-.03( .6)
-.090(1.0)
- .14**(2.0)
-.12**(2.0)
.06
(1.0)
Private
E...,loy.
Agency
-.05( .6)
-.13*
(1.9)
.01( .1)
.08( .7)
-.03( .6)
-.02( .3)
-.17(1.0)
.009( .1)
.130
(1.1)
-.32**(1.9)
.04
( .5)
.02( .2)
Referral by:
Schoo 1
-.10(1.6)
-.04( .8)
.00( .1)
.05
( .6)
-.04(1.4)
-.01( .3)
-.06( .1)
-.030( .4)
.047( .6)
-.08( .7)
.00( .0)
.06
(1.3)
Union
.50**
(2.2)
.13( .8)
.19
(1.1 )
-.31(1.3)
.44***
(4.8)
.14
(1.1)
-.29( .6)
.168( .5)
-.120( .8)
-.67*(1. 7)
.03( .1)
-.04( .2)
Other
-.03( .4)
-.03( .5)
-.07(1.3)
.12
(1.3)
-.02( .6)
-.03( .7)
.02( .2)
.010( .1)
-.074( .8)
.02( .2)
-.05( .8)
-.06(1.0)
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R2 Obs
.227 493
.172 493
.180 524
.226 493
.337 453
.240 524
.657 510
.073 510
.064 510
.147 453
.066 524
.101 229
Source: Estillli!tions of the Equation 3 difference IIIOdel in EOPPdata. The 't' tests are for a
difference from the excluded category of friends, relatives and elllployer referrals and are given in
parenthesis under the coefficient. The 8Ddels all included the following control variables not shown:
Years of schooling, relevant vocational education ~, private vocational education dl8ny, years of
relevant writ experience and its square, potential experience (Mincer definition) and its square,
gender, .hether the elllployee was a stedent .hen hired, .hether the job was subsidized by CETA or JTPA,
tllhether individual was known to be TJTC eligible when hired, average hours wrlted per IIIeek and tllhether
the job was vialed as tBllpOrary. Models predicting outCC8!S at interview or separation contained
controls for tenure and tenure squared. To deal with the tendency of laIinal wages to rise over tillie,
80dels predicting starting wage and profitability during the first three nmths contained controls for
tiE since hire and its square. Models predicting tenure and turnover contained the logaritha of
potential tenure and its square and excluded observations where one of the new hires had been hired for
a temporary job.
* Prob. IT .10 on a tw tail test
** Prob. LT .05 on a two ta il test
*** Prob. IT .01 on a tw tail test
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Table 5
H;r;ng Cost by Recru;tment Source
Hours Recru;t;ng T Stat;st;c
Screen;ng . for D;fference
Interv;ew;ng from Walk InRecru;tment Source
Un;on Referral
Relat;ves of Current Employee or Owner
Fr;ends of Current Employee or Owner
Walk In
School Referral
Employer Referral
Employment Serv;ce Referral
Pr;vate Employment Agency Referral
Other Government Agency Referral
Newspaper Ad
3.8
6.1
8.3
9.0
11.2
12.0
14.8
15.6
17.9
21.9
2.86
4.33
1.24
1.67
2.59
3.71
3.56
3.71
10.35
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T4hle- ,
Raw Validity Coefficients
Mechanical Spatial Perceptual Psychomotor
Comprehension Intelligence Arithmetic Relations Accuracy Abilities
Foreman 23" 28" 2()d 21' 27' 15-
Craftworkers 26' 25' 25' 231 24' 19'
1ndustria1 Workers 24' 2CJ 211 211 2fJ 221
Vehide OperatOrs 22' IS' 25" 16" l'r 25'
Sennce ~upations 26' 28' 13' 1()d IS'
ProteCtive Occupations 23- 23' 18" 17' 21" 14'
Clerical 23' 3CJ 26' 16" 29' 16!
Source: OhiseUi (1973) compilation of published and Wlpublished validity SlUdies for job performance. The raw validity
coefficients have not been corrected for restriction of range or measurement error in the performance rating. The
Perceptual Accuracy categor)' include number comparison, name comparison, cancellation and perceptual speed teSts. They
ISsess the ability to perceive detail quickly. Psychomotor teSts measure the ability to perceive spatial pauems and to
manipulate objects quickly and accurately. This category of tests includ~rracing, tapping. doting. fmger dexterity, hand
dexterity and arm dexterity tests.
. Less Ihan 100 cases.
11 100 to 499 cases.
,
SOOto 999 cases.
, 1,000 to 4,999 cases.
. 5,000 to 9.999 cases.
f 10,000 or more cases
Technician
Mathematics .198***
(
.035)
Verba 1 .051
( .038)
Spat ia 1
Perception
.025( . 029)
Perceptual
Speed
.026( .036)
Psychanotor
Ability
.113***( .027)
Yrs. of Schooling .031*( .016)
Relevant Experience .041***
(.014 )
(Relevant Exp)' -.00094**
(.00046)
Tenure .OB5***(.015)
Tenure' -.0024***( .0006)
Age
-.0024( .0163)
(Age-18)" -.00012
(.00021)
Female .057
(.056)
Black -.138**
(. 060)
Hispanic .046(
.099 )
R. Square .114
Nl6Iber of Obs. 2384
Table 7
Detenminants of Job Performance
High Skill
Clerical
.161***( .033 )
.073**( .035)
- .068***( .026)
.106***
(.031)
.094***
(.026)
.026
(.016)
.019
(.015)
-.00012( .00046)
.113***( .016)
-.0031***
(.0006 )
.040***
(.015)
-.00064***( .00020)
.063
(.072)
-.390***
(.054)
-.286***(
. OB6)
.167
2570
Low Ski 11
Clerical
.207***
(.026)
.070**( .030)
-.002( .021)
.103***
(.025)
.091***
(.021)
-.014
(.013 )
.042***( .012)
-.0009**( .0004)
.0925***
(.014)
-.0026***
(.0006)
.037***( .010)
-.00062***
(.00013)
-.024( . 063)
- .146***( .042)
.053( .069)
.139
4123
Craft
Workers
.168***
.017
-.018
(.020)
.075***( .014)
.048***
(.018)
.083***
(.013)
-.009
(.007)
.040***
(.005)
-.00025*
(.00015)
.0620***
(.0056)
-.00156***
(.00018)
.052***
(.0078)
-.00071 ***
(.00010)
- .396***( .066)
-.247***
(.032)
-.109***
(.042)
.ISO
10016
Operatives
.107***(
. 018)
.012
(.023)
.022
(.016)
.OB2***
(.019 )
.145***
(.015)
-.036***( . OOB)
.036***
(.010)
-.0005
(.0003)
.079***
(.011)
- .0017***(.0004)
.053***( .007)
-. 00072***( .00009 )
-.194***( .043)
-.216***
(.029)
-.053(. 049)
.145
8167
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Service
.223***
(.039)
.078*( .046)
.039( . 034)
.063*
(.038)
.133***( .030)
-.020
(.017)
. OB2***
(.016)
-.0021***
(.0005)
.054***
(.019)
-.00131( .00077)
.044***( .013)
-.00055***
(.00017)
.166**
(.073)
-.031(.063)
-.076
(.IOB)
.153
1927
Source: Analysis of GATB revalidation data in the USEJaploymentServices Individual Data File. Deviations
of job perfonnance ratings fran the mean for the job/establisl1llent are IIIOdeled as a function of deviations
of worker characteristics fran the mean for the job/establisl1llent. The test scores are in a population
standard deviat ion metric. The llletric for job perfoT1llance is the within job/estab 1isl1llent standard
deviation.
* Prob. IT .10 on a two tail test
** Prob. IT .05 on a two tail test
*** Prob. IT .01 on a two tail test
'l'ABI.E 9
DETERHlNANTS OF RELATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE
Yrs of Academic Perceptual Psychomotor Age Occ Occ I'.xp 'l'cnure
Schoolinq Achievement Speed skills ~Square ~Squarc "enure Square
~~Plant
Operators -.013 .244... .112. .117.. .040. -.00053 .024 -.0003') .096. -.002 .181 651
(.43) (3.09) (1.68) (2.30) ( 1. (9) (1.45) (.51) (.20) ( 1. 93) ( 1. 36 )
Technician .020. .277... .024 .117... -.005 -.00000 .041...
-.00097" .084.. -.0023... .115 2384
(1.75) (0.25) (.72) (4.35) (.33) (.36) (2.93) (2.11) (5.4"1) (3.66)
Craft Workers -.017.. .249... .060.. .079... .046... -.00065... .046... -.00034... .064... -.0016... .141 10061
(2.40) (15.00) (3.36) (5.96) (5.06) (6.51) (0.43) (2.27) (11.37) (8.60)
High Skill Clerical .013 .272... .005... .094... .035" -.00051.. .020 -.00017 .11.1... -.00316... .145 2570
(.02) (0.75) (3.17) (3.63) (2.31) (2.55) (1.35) (.36) (7.35) (5.01)
Low Skill Clerical
-.015 .296... .107... .092... .035'..
-.00057" .042...
-.00090" .095... -.0027"". .135 4124(1.20) (11.91) (4.43) (4.40) (3.46) (4.29) (3.36) (2.15) (6.'13) (4.94)
Service -.024 .290... .072.. .130... .045*** -.00056... .004... -.0022... .052... -.0012 .152 1928(1.45) (0.14) (1.96) (4.65) (3.43) (3.20) (5.16) (4.16) (2.70) (1.61)
Operatives &
-.049." .109.". .079... .140... .047... -.00064... .030... -.00052 .078'..
-.00166'''. .137 0167
Laborers (6.59) (10.65) (4.37) (9.53) (6.62) (6.79) (3.77) ( 1. 58) (7.30) (4.65)
Sales Clcrks
-.024 .119 .118 .167.. .071... -.00004.. -.009 .0012 .026 -.0000 .087 417
(.70) (1.34) (1.41) (2.30) (2.63) (2.45) (.26) ( 1. 08) (.62) (.50)
oJ'"
......
N
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Table 9
SIMUlATED IMPACT OF CHANGES FROM C~RENT AlLOCATION:
to
RANDOMASSIGNMENT
and to
ASSIGNMENTBASEDON GATBANDOCCUPATIONAlEXPERIENCE
Nlftber Random AssiQnment GATB &Exper ReMatchinQ
Average Coefficient Standard of Loss Aggregate loss Aggregate
~nsation of Deviation Workers Per loss per Gain
per FTE Variation of Output (lOOO's) Worker (billions) Worker (billions)
Plant
Operators $33.808 $91.020 228 -$7.482 -$ 1. 7 $123.474 $ 28.1
Tecmicians $26.649 33.8 $13.668 5261 -$6.738 -$35.4 $ 9.819 $ 51. 7
Craft Workers $29.655 27.6 $12.399 13073 -$2.868 -$37.5 $ 4.359 $ 57.0
High Skill
Clerical $23.065 25.5 $ 8.925 5227 -$3.809 -$19.9 $ 449 $ 2.3
Routine
Clerical $19.472 16.7 $ 4.934 12082 -$1.172 -$14.2 $ 147 $ 1.8
Service bc.
Police a Fire $15.496 17.3 $ 4.068 12724 +$ 689 $ 8.8 $ 416 $ 5.3
Operatives &
Laborers $23.828 14.0 $ 5.062 16816 +$ 194 $ 3.3 -$ 1.668 -$28.1
Sa les Clerks $17.542 29.8 $ 5.228 5682 -$ 560 -$ 3.2 -$ 5.675 -$32.3
All Workers $22.566 $ 6.708 71.132 -$1.407 -$100.1 $ 1.208 $ 85.9
Estimates of the effect of random assignment in column 5 and 6 compare the predicted productivity of current members
of each occupation with the mean predicted productivity in that occupation of everyone in the USES data set.
Estimates of the effect of rematching workers based on occupational experience and three GATB aptitude composites
in column 7 and 8 are calculated by comparing the predicted productivity of current members of each occupation to
the predicted productivity of those assigned on the basis of equation 4a [the equation which does not make use of
information on gender and ethnicity]. Performance predictions based on equation 4a were made for each occupation
and each worker. Because the standard deviation of output measured in dollars of plant operators was so high, this
occupation got first pick. Then came technicians. craft occupations etc. Those not selected for one of the top
7 occupations became sales clerks. Once workers were assigned to occupations on the basis of equation 4a or randomly
as in the case of the first simulation, predicted job performance was calculated using equation 4b, the best fitting
model of job performance which included individual variables for gender, race and Hispanic. Dollar impacts were
calculated by correcting for selection on the dependent variable (restriction of range in the psychological
literature) by multiplying by 1.76 and then multiplying by the standard deviation of output in dollars.] No
adjustments were made for the unreliability of performance ratings.
Table 10
THE EFFECT OF THE RE-MATCHING
ON THE MEAN ABILITY, GENDERAND ETHNICITY
OF OCCUPATIONS
General
Abi lity Percent Percent Percent(Pop SO's) Education Female Black Hispanic
Current Change Current Change Current Change Current Change Canmt 0alJe
level level level level level
Plant Operator .09 +2.03 12.1 2.09 2 +75 11.1 -11 5.1 -5
Technician .28 1.03 13.7 .22 55 +1 8.1
- 6 3.4 -1
Craft -.09 .65 11.9 .53 4 +43 7.1 - 4 7.4 -3
High Ski 11
Clerical .32 .02 12.9 .67 83 -16 10.1
- 4 5.4 -1
low Skill
Clerical .00 .03 12.6 -.48 82 -18 10.6 - 4 5.7 0
Service Exc.
Police a Fire -.52 .12 11.8 .01 8Z -14 18.0
- 6 8.3 0
Operative -.59 -.46 11.3 -.01 66 0 14.7 + 7 10.0 +2
Sales Clerk -.02 -1.59 12.3 -1.00
-B§ -20 8.2 +24 5.6 +3
All Occupations
-.21 12.1 52 11.9 7.3
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This table reports the gender, ethnicity, schooling and test scores of current 8e111bersof each occupation and the
changes in each of these variables that wuld result if new hires had been selected on the basis of the equation 4a
predicted productivity regressions (which ignore race and ethnicity). The si8.llation was conducted by first
calculating the equation 4a perfonnance predictions for each IIIOrkerin each occupation. Because the standard
deviation of output Easured in dollars of plant operators was so high, this occupation got first pick. Then
C8II! technicians, craft occupations etc. Those not selected for one of the top 7 occupations becaIIIe sales clerks.
;.
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APPENDIX D
STUDIES OF OUTPUT VARIABILITY
A search for studies of output variability yielded 49 published and
8 unpublished papers covering 94 distinct jobs.. Their results are reported
in tables 1 through 4. Table 1 summarizes the studies of output variability
among semiskilled factory workers. The jobs known to be paid on a piece
rate basis are not included. in the table. Schmidt and Hunter (1983) found
that such jobs typically have smaller coefficients of variation. Apparently
when workers are paid on a piece rate basis, quit rates are more responsive
to productivity than when pay is on an hourly basis. The less productive
workers self select themselves out of such jobs and the surviving job
incumbents become more and more similar in their output.
Estimates of productivity standard deviations (SD$) in 1985 dollars are
reported in column 2 of the tables. In most cases the author of the study
made no attempt to estimate SD$' s, so the estimate has been calculated from
the cv. Such estimates are placed in a parenthesis. The estimates of SD$
were derived as a product of the CV, the mean compensation for that job and
the ratio of value added to compensation for that industry. !his ratio is
1.52 for private non-farm business excluding mining, trade, finance and real
estate. The value added to compensation ratio in retailing and in real estate
was much too high to be used as an adjustment factor. So for all sales
occupations it was assumed that SD$ = CV ~imes average canpensation. The
SD$ of semiskilled factory jobs ranged from $1132 to $'7811 and averaged $5062
for jobs not known to be paid on a piece rate.
Table 2 reports managerial estimates of coefficients of variation and
productivity SD$'s for plant operators and a number of craft occupations.
For craft occupations other than plant operators, the average CV is 27.6
percent and the average SD$ is $12,399. These are smaller than for plant
operators and larger than those for semi-skilled factory workers. Within
the ranks of blue collar workers there is a clear tendency for coefficients
of variation and standard deviations of output to rise with the complexity
and wage rate of the job.
OUtput variability is also great in professional and high level
managerial occupations. Users of communication satellites, for example,
are going to save billions of dollars as a result of a discovery by a
scientist at Comsat which has doubled the effective lifetime of satellites.
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Exxon had invested a billion dollars in its shale oil operation at Parachute
Creek before giving up on the enterprise. A wiser CEO or better staff work
might have avoided or reduced this loss. It does not take many such examples
to produce a very large standard deviation of output for professional and
high level managerial jobs. In most white collar jobs, however, output
variability across incumbents is much smaller.
Table 3 reports the results of studies of output variability in clerical
occupations. In many of these studies hard measures of output (e. 9 ., cards
punched) were the basis for calculating coefficients of variation.
Table 4 contains estimates of CVs and standard deviations of output
for the remainder of the occupational distribution: managerial, technical,
sales service personnel. For sales personnel the CVs are based on hard data,
distributions of actual sales. The variability of output in sales occupations
is clearly higher than in most other occupations and the variability appears
to rise with the complexity of the product that is being sold and the amount
of initiative required to sell large amounts of the product. For high level
sales personnel working in finance and manufacturing many of them Paid on
a commission basis, the coefficient of variation is 62.8 percent while for
sales clerks it is 29.8 percent. When multiplied by mean levels of
compensation for full time workers in these occupations, these CVs translate
into output standard deviations of $15000 and $5228.
For most of the managerial and technical jobs studied physical measures
of output were not definable so the supervisors were asked to report dollar
amounts of output expected from workers at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentiles
of the job performance distribution. Coefficients of variation averaged.
36 percent for technicians implying an output standard deviation of $13668.
The coefficient of variation was 33 percent for low level managers and 20.6
percent in the only three service occupations for which data is available..
It was felt that these three jobs represented too small a sample to produce
reliable estimates of the CV for all service jobs except police and fire
fighting so the estimate of the service CV employed in the rest of the paper
is an unweighted average of the CVs for operatives, low skill clerical workers
and 20.6, the average for the three service jobs for which there is data
on the variability of output. While the standard deviation of output appears
.
to be substantial (about $4000) in full time full year service jobs, there
is clearly a positive correlation between average wage levels and SD$'s.
PO-
WS-
GS-
SHMM-
S(m) -
S(T)-
SE -
SeD)-
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Methods used to Estimate the Coefficient of
Variation and standard Deviations of Output
Physical Output - Where a piece rate prevails, ticket earnings are
used as the output measure. Where pay is hourly, physical quantity
of output or percent of standard output for the job is used as the
output measure. CV's are calculated from this data and SD$s are
constructed by using value added per employee (adjusted for relative
wage rates) to value the productivity of the average worker.
Work Sample - A sample of the job tasks is taken and workers are
observed performing these tasks under controlled conditions. To
be useful for calculating a CV, the WS must be defined in units that
have a ratio scale that corresponds to output such as 50 lb sacks
carried from A to B. It measures peak performance and thus probably
does not measure effort as actually applied to a real job. SD$s
are calculated from CV' s in same way they are calculated frem PO
based CV's.
Gross Sales - CV's are the SD of sales across sales personnel divided
by the mean level of sales. SD$ equals the CV times the mean
compensation of sales personnel. GS(A) is calculated using a weighted
average of the sales of different products.
Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie and Muldrow (1979) Method. Managers who
supervise job incumbents are asked to place monetary values on the
output produced by an employee at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentile
of the job performance distribution. The metric in which they are
asked to make these judgement is the cost to have an "outside firms
provide these products and services." !his yields direct estimates
of SD$ and a rough estimate of the CV can be calculated from (Pes -
P~s)/2Pso.
Schmidt et al (1979) method with supervisors making their judgments
after being supplied a mean output derived frem canpany records.
Schmidt et al (1979) method with outliers dropped frem the
calculation.
Supervisor's estimate for actual employees. Supervisors give dollar
values for the productivity of a sample of actual employees. The
mean and standard deviation is calculated frem this distribution.
Schmidt et al (1979) method as modified by Dunnette et al (1982).
A first round of workshops with supervisors identified examples of
unusually effective, unusually ineffective and average levels of
job performance by plant operators. Eight dimensions of performance
were developed from these examples and supervisors were asked to
retranslate and scale the 667 performance examples in a second round
of workshops. Finally participants were asked to estimate dollar
value of performance at the 85th, 50th and 15th percentile. Negative
values were changed to zero.
18.4 (4129) PO 8 Rothe (1946)
20.5 (6411) PO 130 Rothe (1947)
13.2 (3399) PO 33 Tiff in (1947)
12.8 (4035) PO 294 Barnes (1958)
15.0 (3782) PO 27 Rothe & Nye(1958)
7.5 $2364 PO 61 Rothe & Nye (1958)
11.7 $3688 PO 37 Rothe' Nye (1959)
25 $7881 CA Roche (1961)
13.7 (6064) WS 249 Arnold et ale (1983)
6.8 $3000 SHMM NA Rauschenberger (1986)
16.2 WS 374 Vineberg' Taylor (1972)
9.1 PO 76 Baumberger (1921)
8.9 PO 30 Wyatt (1927)
19.1 PO 18 Wyatt (1932)
8.7 PO 18 Hearnshaw (1937)
8.6 (2805) PO 19 Stead & Shartle (1940)
15.1 (2256) PO 13 Lawshe (1948)
14.6 (1732) PO 100 Wechsler (1952)
12.7 (3279) PO 65 Wechsler (1952)
17.7 (4596) PO 40 McCormick' Tiffin (1974'
14.1 (3638) PO 138 McCormick' Tiffin (1974,
~(6095) PO 35 McCormick & Tiffin (1974,
14.0 $ 5062
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UNSKILLED AND SEMISKILLED BLUE COLIAR WORKERS
TABLE 1
c.v.
of
Output
(Incumb)
standard
Deviation
in 1985
Dollars. Method
Sample
Size Source
Hourly or Weekly Pay
Butter Wrappers
Machine Operators
Electrical Workers
Assembly Worker
Coil Winders
Craft
Machine Operators
Radial Drill Operator
Entry Level Steelworkers
Entry Level Steelworkers
Armor Crewman
Pay Fonn: Unknown
Machine Operator
Soap Wrappers
~ile Sizing & Sorting
Paper Sorters
Lamp Shade Manufac.
Wool Pullers
Machine Sewers
Electrical Workers
Cable Makers
Electrical Workers
Assemblers
Estimates of standard deviation of the output (SD$) of full time full year workers that
are presented in parenthesis were derived from coefficients of variation (CV) for output.
For jobs outside of mining,retailing and finance it was assumed that a more capable worker
would necessitate proportionately more materials, energy inputs, overhead labor inputs
but not necessitate additional capital. 'rhis means that the metric of the CV is K-L
productivity and thus that in manufacturing where the ratio of value added to compensation
Iis 1.51, a 10 percent gain in K-L productivity has a dollar value equal to about 15 percent 1
of compensation. Consequently, SD$j = CVj (GNP per full time equivalent worker in industry .
k)(wagekj!(wagek) where wagekj = average wage of occupation j in industry k and wagek
is average wage in industry k. The ratio of occupation 8j"s earnings to the industry
average was derived from Table 2 of Occupation by Industry Subject Report of the 1980
Census.
Table 2
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PRECISION PRODUCTION AND CRAFT OCCUPATIONS
Plant and System Operators
Nuclear Control Room Oper.
Fossil Fuel Cont. Room Oper.
Nuclear Plant Operator
Fossil Fuel Plant Operator
Hydro Plant Operator
Refinery Head Operator
OUtside Operator
Pump Operator
Other Craft Workers
Welders-Refinery
Handcraft Workers
Drillers
Arc Welder
Radar Mechanics [1]
Radar Mechanics 12J
Welders
Repairman
OUtside Mechanic
Electrician
Sheet Metal Worker
Plumber
Painter
Meat cutter
Maintenance & Tool Room Jobs
Supervisors
Steel: Foreman (average)
C.V. Standard
of Deviation
output in 1985
(Incumb) Dollars Method
108
72
105
61
53
37.3
17.1
31
16.0
40.3
20.1
13.7
21.4
48.4
23
25
24
24
26
46
27.6
$277,850
$155,340
$ 97,370
$ 39,455
$ 27,030
$ 15,355
$ 14,356
$ 10,381
$ 91,020
$ 16,775
$ 5,390
$ 9,772
$ 5,039
$ 21.800
$ 12,539
$ 11,696
$ 11,856
$ 8,626
$ 7,778
SeD)
SeD)
SeD)
SeD)
SeD)
SE
SE
SE
SE
PO
PO
WS
WS
WS
PO
WS
SE
SHMM
SHMM
SHMM
SHMM
SHMM
SHMM
$ 12,399
$ 67,923 SHMM
Sample
Size
14
NA
11
49
107
51
25
385
12
104
22
66
41
14
Source
34
48
19
20
31
19
19
17
Dunnette et al.
Dunnette et al.
Dunnette et al.
Dunnette et al.
Dunnette et al.
Wroten (1984)
Wroten (1984)
Wroten (1984)
(1982)
(1982)
(1982)
(1982)
(1982)
Wroten (1984)
Evans (1940)
Lawshe (1948)
U.S. Job Service
Whipple (1969)
Whipple (1969)
Rothe (1970)
Vineberg & Taylor
Wroten (1984)
MacManus (1986)
MacManus (1986)
MacManus (1986)
MacManus (1986 )
MacManus (1986)
Bolda (1985)
(1966)
(1972)
11 Rauschenberger (1985)
The data on electric utility industry was collected in 1981 so the inflation factor based
on the growth of utility wages and salaries per FTE is 1.30. The petroleum refinery
industry inflation factor since 1983 is 1.10. The steel industry inflation factor is
1.084 for 1985 vs. 1982.
TABLE 3
CLERICAL
Routine Clerical Jobs
Telegraph Operator 13.2 PO 14 Baumberger (1920)
Machine Bookkeepers 8.4 PO 39 Hay (1943)
File Clerks 17.9 PO 61 Gaylord (1951)
Card Punch Operator 11.5 (2488) PO NA Klemmer' Lockhead (1962)
Proof Machine Operator 13.4 (2932) PO NA Klemmer' Lockhead (1962)
Typists 18.6 (3980) PO 616 Stead' Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator (Day) 10.7 (2278) PO 113 Stead' Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator 21.6 (4550) PO 62 Stead' Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator 12.9 (2746) PO 121 Stead' Shartle (1962)
Proofreader 18.5 WS 57 US Job Service (1972)
~elephone Operator 17.7 WS 1091 Gael et ale (1975a)
Mail Carriers 22.5 WS 374 US Postal Service (1981)
Mail Handlers 22.7 WS 373 US Postal Service (1981)
Clerical 25 $ 5529 S(M) 91 Burke (1985)
CUstoms Inspector 15.7 WS 188 Corts et a1. (1977)
Meter Reader 18 $ 4481 SHMM 14 MacManus (1986)
~oll-~icket Sorters 14.9 PO 13 Maier' Verser (1982)
16.7 $ 4934
Clerical with Decision Making
Supply Specialist 26.5 ws 394 Vineberg' Taylor (1977)
Mail Distribution 39.2 WS 417 US Postal Service (1981)
Claims Processor 28.5 $ 5111 CA 15 Ledvinka et ale (1983)
Claims Evaluators 24.5 $ 4896 PO 176 DeSimone et al. (1986)
n
"
23.8 $ 3876 SHMM 27 n n n
Claims Authorizer 20.5 WS 233 Trattner et al (1977)
~icket Agent 26 $ 8411 SHMM 9 MacManus (1986)
Head Teller - Bank (15) $ 2369 SeT) Mathieu' Leonard (1986)
25.5 $ 8925
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Technical
Computer Programmer 32 $16550 SHMM Schmidt et ale (1979)
Budget Analyst (47) $15062 SHMM Hunter & Schmidt (1982)
Park Ranger 33 $ 4828 SHMM Schmidt et ale (1984)
Instrument Tech. - Refinery (20) $28720 SE 14 Wroten (1984)
Computer Programmer 47 $15888 SHMM Rich & Boudreau (1986)
Cartographic Technician 33.5 WS 443 Campbell et a1. (1973)
33.8 $13668
Managerial
Convenience Store Manager 51 $13967 SHMM 110 Weekley et ale (1985)
Bank Branch Manager (35) $10064 SIT) Mathieu' Leonard (1986)
Bank Operations Manager (14) $ 3122 SIT) Mathieu' Leonard (1986)
33.3
High Level Sales
District Sales - Food Manu. 32 ($ 8958)- SHMM 4 Cascio' Silbey (1979)
Insurance Salesman 37.5 $ 5219 CA 92 Bobko (1983)
District Sales Rep. Mfg. 41.3 $11529 GS 18 Burke' Frederick (1984)
Real Estate Sales 83 $21271 SHMM 63 MacManus (1986)
Life Insurance Sales 120 $12453 GS Brown (1981)
-62.8
Sales Clerk
Sales Clerks 22.2 (2807) GS 153 Stead' Shartle (1940)
Cashiers 17.3 (2147) WS 29 Lawshe (1948)
Sales Clerks 47.3 (5734) GS 18 Lawshe (1948)
Grocery Checker 19.3 WS 92 US Job Service (1976)
Cashier Checker 43 $11379 SHMM 29 MacManus (1986)
29.8 $ 5228
Service
Cooks 21.4 WS 385 Vineberg' Taylor (1972;
Package Wrappers 24.1 PO 27 Blum' Candee (1941)
Package Packers 16.4 PO 10 Blum & Candee (1941)
Average of 3 20.6
Average of Service, Low
Clerical' Operatives 17.3 $ 4068
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TABLE 4
MANAGERIAL, "TECHNICAL, SALES AND SERVICE WORKERS
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Footnotes for Table 3
-The Programmer Aptitude Tests raw validity is .38 based on Schmidt,
Rosenberg and Hunter's (1980) validity generalization of data on 1299
programmers.
bThe estimate of GMA job performance raw validities for technical jobs
is based on 20 occupations and a total of 2417 cases. The estimate for
professional occupations is based on 2 occupations and a total of 109 cases.
Schmidt, Mack & Hunter classify the park ranger job as a level 3 job using
Hunters (1983) classification scheme. For a level 3 job the raw validity
of GMA is .28.
CGMA raw validity for managers is a simple average of 9 separate managerial
occupations from the GATS manual.
dThe raw validity estimate is from Churchill et al's "The Determinants
of Sales Person Performance: A Meta-Analysis" (1985) and is based on 44
studies which used objective company data with controls for environmental
conditions. Since actual sales data were used it is assumed that criterion
reliability is 1.0.
-Cascio and Silbey estimated the average compensation of sales personnel
to be $75 a day or $18000 a year in 1978. This was inflated to 1985 wage
levels by multiplying by 1.555 and then mult~lied by cv to estimate SD$.
~Bobko et al, SHMM type estimate of SD$ was $4967 which is inflated to
1985 wage levels by multiplying by 1.174 the growth of wages and salaries
in the industry from 1982 to 1985.
.Pearlman, Schmidt, and Hunter 1980.
hValidity estimate for sales clerk jobs is an average of Ghiselli's estimate
(-.0&) and the mean of more recent studies (.14) is reported by Hunter
and Hunter (1984).
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CONSTRUCTION OF WEIGHTS FOR U. S. E. S.
GATB REVALIDATION DATA
Number of Individuals Number Employed Weights
in USES Data Set (1000's)
lion
Black
All Black Hisp All Black Hisp Hisp Black Hisp
Plant Oper. 651 162 35 228 25.3 11.6 421 156 331
Technician 2390 583 249 5261 426 178 Z989 731 716
High Sk ill IOZSZ 1676 789 13112 931 970 1440 555 1230
Craft
High Skill 2583 623 172 5220 525 282 2468 843 1639
Clerical
Lw Skill 4153 1223 289 12089 1281 689 3832 1047 2384
Clerical
Service exc. 1933 759 125 13445 2144 1117 9451 3180 8936
Police' Fire
Operative 8177 2873 653 16816 2472 1683 2723 860 2577
Sa 1es Clerk 422 112 Z9 5682 466 318 17430 4160 10970
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